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Abstract 
Background: When a patent of an active ingredient expires, generic companies can enter the 
market and offer equivalent drugs to compete against the brand version. Unless the general 
practitioner (GP) states otherwise in the prescription, i.e. makes a reservation, the patient will 
be dispensed the generic version in the pharmacy. The patient can still claim the brand 
version, but has to pay the additional cost himself. There are a few medically justifiable 
reasons for the GP to prefer the brand version, and about 7% of the prescriptions in Norway 
have reservations against generic substitution. However, the large variation in reservation 
between doctors, suggests that many reservations are based on non-medical considerations. 
Previous research has shown that factors such as price, age of doctor, patient population, 
pharmacist mark-ups and maturity of generic markets explain some of the variation.   
 
Objectives: This thesis investigates the extents to which market conditions and general 
practitioners’ characteristics might explain variations in the rates of generic reservation. In 
addition to the previously studied factors we will introduce some new explanatory variables 
that, to our knowledge, have not been tested before. Specifically, the effect of competition 
between GPs in municipalities might provide new insights.  
 
Methods: To find links between GP-reservation and the above-mentioned characteristics, data 
from pharmacy sales and the Norwegian GP-registry were analysed. Both descriptive 
statistics and alternative models (binary, fixed effects, OLS regression, two-part models) 
were used to find marginal effects of the variables tested on reservation level.     
 
Results: A major contribution of this thesis relates to the gatekeeper function of GPs: our 
results show that increased competition between GPs results in more generic reservation. 
Furthermore, older GPs use reservation more often, whilst the effects of sex and speciality 
are more inconclusive. Increased confidence in generics defined as frequent prescriptions, 
translates into lower reservation levels. Active ingredients that have recently become subject 
to generic competition have higher reservation levels. In general, the effects are also stronger 
in new generic markets as compared to older markets. The results are consistent across the 
alternative models used.  
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1 Introduction 
 
When a patent for a drug expires, generic competitors can enter the market and compete for 
market shares by using the same active ingredient as was earlier patented. For many years, 
the choice of prescription was entirely at the discretion of the physician: if the prescription 
had the brand name, this is what the patient was dispensed. As of March 2001, to ensure cost 
savings for both the patient and the national insurance, pharmacies were allowed to substitute 
drugs within the same active ingredient if deemed possible by the Norwegian Medicines 
Agency.  
 
The physician may still prescribe the most expensive product, but the pharmacy will offer the 
generic equivalent to a lower price to the customer. The national insurance scheme (NIS) will 
only reimburse the price of the product with the lowest price, except for the cases when the 
physician has made a reservation against generic substitution. If such a reservation is made, 
NIS pays the added cost of being prescribed a brand drug. Today, GPs reserve against generic 
substitution in about 7.5% of prescriptions.1 In absence of a reservation note from the GP, 
patients are still allowed to receive the brand drug, but must pay the added cost out-of-pocket.  
  
Although generics contain the same active ingredient, there are some medically justifiable 
reasons to prefer the brand drug. To a large extent however, GPs have a wide range of 
patients and provide care for fairly similar patient populations. You would therefore expect 
that reservation rates do not differ much between GPs. When they do, several explanations 
might exist. This master thesis seeks to investigate characteristics of physicians, and the 
market conditions in which they operate, that might explain variation in generic reservation 
rates. Previously studied factors like sex, age, geographical location and price differences will 
be investigated, in addition to some hitherto less explored aspects related to generic market 
entry and the competitive environment of GPs. Detailed datasets will be used to analyse the 
different effects quantitatively.  
 
1 https://helfo.no/Documents/Analyser og rapporter/Kontrollrapport-Legens reservasjon mot 
likeverdig bytte på apotek-2015.pdf 
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The thesis2 will be structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides an institutional background for 
analysing reservation. Chapter 3 makes the theoretical foundation for the hypotheses’ 
analysed. Chapter 4 explains how the data was obtained and aggregated in order to perform 
the statistical analysis in Chapter 5. The results of the different models are presented in 
Chapter 6, and further discussed in Chapter 7. Lastly, Chapter 8 provides the conclusion.  
 
2 Acknowledging that a majority of GPs in this sample are men, we will for simplicity use 
masculine.  To keep it simple, patients will also be referred by use of masculine. 
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2 Institutional arrangements 
 
2.1 The market for general practitioners (GPs) 
GPs form an important part of the primary health service in Norway. Since 2001 when the 
organization of general practitioners was reformed, GPs are directly responsible for all 
patients enrolled on their list. The maximum number of patients on the list is chosen by the 
GP himself, but is not to exceed an upper limit of 2500 patients (Norwegian Medical 
Association, 2013, pp. 68-69). Some relevant statistics of the Norwegian GP-market are 
provided in Table 1.  
Table 1: Characteristics of General Practitioners (GPs) in Norway 
Patients per list (mean) 1 132  
Number of female GPs 1 768 (39%) Average of 4 quarters in 2014 
Number of male GPs 2 710 (61%) Average of 4 quarters in 2014 
Number of specialists 2 542 (53.3%)3  
Number of ordinary patient initiated switches 4 261 122 Sum of 4 quarters in 2014 
Total number of patient initiated switches 366 145 Sum of 4 quarters in 2014 
Source: Norwegian Directorate of Health for 2014 (2015) 
Whenever a patient has a medical condition, he has to consult his designated GP for an 
appointment, or seek the emergency care unit in cases of urgency. If a patient is unhappy 
with his GP, or for other reasons prefers a different GP, he can switch to a new GP with open 
spots on his list (Norwgian Directorate of Health, 2015)5. 
 
2.1.1 Remuneration 
The majority of GPs in Norway are paid in a combination of fee for service (FFS) and 
capitation6. The FFS part is regulated by law, and ranges widely depending on the nature of 
the intervention. The capitation part is a fixed sum per patient – NOK 427 as of 1. July 20157. 
FFS and capitation form the GPs income. Accordingly, income can be increased by attracting 
3 This number is from NMA, as HELFO has not provided statistics for specialists since 2004. 
http://legeforeningen.no/Emner/Andre-emner/Legestatistikk/Yrkesaktive- leger-i-
Norge/Legeforeningens-fastlegestatistikk---artikkel/ 
4Switches due to patients moving or GPs reducing or ending their practice are not included.  
5 A patient can switch up to twice a year. One additional switch is given to those who change 
place of residence 
6 A small number of GPs are salaried, commonly those in areas with low population density.  
7 https://helfo.no/helseaktor/kommuner-og-fylkeskommuner/basistilskudd-for-
fastlegeordningen-i-kommunene 
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more patients and thereby augmenting the capitation-based income, and/or increase the 
number of services for each patient already on the list. 
 
2.1.2 Patient co-payment 
With a few exceptions8, all patients are charged with a co-payment when visiting their GP 
that varies depending on the services provided. If the accumulated co-payments in a calendar 
year reach an upper ceiling (egenandelstak 1) of NOK 2,185, the public third party payer 
(NIS) covers all exceeding expenses (HELFO, 2015b). The services included in 
“egenandelstak 1” are limited to co-payments to doctors, pharmacies, physiologists, 
hospitals, x-ray institutes and patient-travels (HELFO, 2015d).  For drugs bought at 
pharmacies, the co-payment is 38%, but at a maximum of NOK 520 per delivery (HELFO, 
2015c). Many patients reach the co-payment ceiling quite rapidly, especially those with 
chronic conditions. In 2009, 900 000 people9 reached the ceiling within the calendar year.    
 
2.2 The market for generics 
To encourage innovation of new drugs, patents are given to new active agents. This gives the 
manufacturer a temporary monopoly to recuperate the costs of development, in addition to 
earning a profit. Once the patent expires, other manufacturers can copy the active 
ingredients10 of the brand drug and make generic versions. 
 
As defined by the WHO (2015b);  ”a generic drug is a pharmaceutical product, usually 
intended to be interchangeable with an innovator product, that is manufactured without a 
licence from the innovator company and marketed after the expiry date of the patent or other 
exclusive rights”.  
 
In order to be considered interchangeable, the generic has to have the same drug preparation 
and be considered bioequivalent to the brand drug. The latter is determined through testing 
the bioavailability of the generic and compared its brand counterpart. Bioavailability is a 
8 Prenatal care control, patients under 16 years old, psychotherapeutic care of children under 
the age of 18, communicable diseases of public concern. 
9https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/be20df89eefb4e10beaf237622a43fe4/no/pdfs/prp2
00920100020000dddpdfs.pdf p. 12 
10 The excipients may however differ.  
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measurement11 of the extent to which an active ingredient is absorbed by the body (Merck , 
2014). Numerous tests have concluded that generics have the same clinical effect as brand 
drugs when compared using studies of bioequivalence (NOMA, 2015b).  
 
Active ingredients are classified in the anatomic classification (ATC) system12. The system 
classifies active ingredients over five levels according to their: anatomical; therapeutic; 
pharmacological; chemical groups, and; subgroups (WHO, 2015a). Accordingly, a generic 
drug and its reference drug always have the same ATC number.  
 
There are various ways of obtaining a marketing licence for generics. An application for a 
licence can be acquired centrally through the European Medicines Agency (EMA) for the 
whole European Economic Area (EEA), or decentralized through national medicines 
agencies for marketing in a limited number of countries (NOMA, 2015e) 
 
If a generic competitor is deemed substitutable with its branded counterpart, NOMA puts it 
on the “substitution list” (byttelisten)13. The list states which drugs can be substituted in the 
pharmacy within a “substitution group” (byttegruppe). All drugs within a substitution group 
contain the same active ingredient and the same drug preparation. The drugs might however 
differ in terms of strength and package size.  The list is updated twice a month, and 
distributed to all pharmacies (NOMA, 2015d). 
 
2.2.1 Maximum price 
All prescription-only medicines (POMs) entering the Norwegian market are priced according 
to a reference price system, fully explained by NOMA (2015c). The reference price system 
states that pharmacies can claim a maximum retail price, with some exceptions14, equal to the 
11 The bioavailability is assessed using a statistical method called plasma concentration-time 
relationship (AUC). Two drugs are considered bioequivalent if 90% of the confidence 
interval for the relationship between the average of the AUC-measurements lie within the 
range of 0.8 – 1.25. 
12 See Appendix A for thourough explanation of the ATC system 
13 A separate group consisting of a wide range of professionals, called ”Byttegruppen” acts 
as an advisory body to NOMA on questions relating to the substitutability of drugs.  
14 If there is a viable risk that the producer will not find it profitable enough to market its drug 
on the Norwegian market. See http://www.legemiddelverket.no/Blaa_resept_og_pris/pris-
paa-legemidler/maksimalpris/Documents/Retningslinjer%20for%20prisfastsettelse.pdf 
for a thorough explanation.  
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average price of the three lowest priced countries in a group of nine reference countries15. 
When a medicine’s patent expires, generic competitors can file an application to NOMA for a 
marketing licence for that active ingredient. If granted, the generic enters into competition 
with the branded drug16.  
 
2.2.2 Stepped price 
The stepped price system was introduced in 2005, and is a mechanism for ensuring reduced 
prices on medicines once generic competition has arisen. The stepped price is the maximum 
price refunded by NIS. The system entails a percentage reduction of the previously defined 
maximum retail price over two to three cuts: the first cut is a 35% reduction, and commences 
once there is generic competition; the second cut occurs after 6 months, and; the third 12 
months after the second, at the earliest. The size of the last two cuts depends on the sales of 
the active ingredient (Norwegian Pharmacy Association, 2015, pp. 34-37). An overview is 
provided in below17.  
Table 2: Example of cuts in stepped price system 
Sales before generic 
competition 
1st price cut  2nd price cut 3rd price cut 
Below 100 mill NOK 35% 59% Sales > 15 mill 69% 
Above 100 mill NOK 
35% 81% Sales > 30 mill 88% 
Sales > 100 mill 90% 
(NOMA, 2015f) 
NOMA can use discretion with respect to setting the stepped price. This includes the option 
not to implement cuts if there is reason to believe that in doing so, generic competitors will 
find it unprofitable to stay in the market (Festøy & Ognøy, 2015, p. 21). 
All pharmacies are obliged to offer at least one drug within the substitution group on stepped 
price. Because pharmacies commonly offer only one drug on stepped price, manufacturers 
compete towards wholesalers in order to become the preferred drug. In most cases, but not 
15 Sweden, Denmark, Netherland, Great Britain, Finland, Germany, Austria, Belgium and 
Ireland  
16 It is voluntary for the generic company sell a certain drug or package even if granted a 
licence. 
17 In addition to the general cuts in Table 2, the active ingredients ”atorvastatin” and 
”simvastatin” have cuts of 94% and 96%, respectively.  
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always, this is a generic. Drugs not on stepped price, commonly the branded version, are 
priced according to the higher maximum price described above (NOMA, 2015f). NIS usually 
only covers the price of the stepped priced drug. If the patient for some reason prefers the 
more expensive brand version (patient reservation), he has to pay the difference between the 
maximum price and the stepped price out of pocket in addition to the co-payment. Only the 
co-payment, however, enters into the calculation of the co-payment ceiling (Norwegian 
Pharmacy Association, 2015, p. 36).  
 
2.2.3 Reservation against generic substitution 
The doctor often prescribes the brand name of the active ingredient. This does not impede the 
pharmacy in giving the generic version to the patient. If the doctor prefers the patient to use 
the brand version, even though it has entered into generic competition, he must state so in the 
prescription – he makes a reservation against generic substitution. In doing so, NIS pays the 
added cost, not the patient. The entire co-payment of the drug also enters into the calculation 
of the payment ceiling (NOK 2185 as of 01.01.2015). Since many patients reach the co-
payment ceiling within a calendar year, this is assumed to be of less importance however18.  
 
In the example of the patients’ expenses in Table 3 below, all cuts are based on an initial 
maximum price of NOK 1000. However, the price of the branded drug will in most cases be 
reduced by the mechanisms of the maximum price system where comparator countries reduce 
prices. In the example, the price of the branded drug will therefore be lowered gradually from 
NOK 1000. The co-payment in situations where a doctor reservation has been made will 
therefore be reduced as time is passed from generic entry. 
 
18 In any case the patient’s co-payment will increase compared to choosing the drug on 
stepped price, due to the fact that the maximum price is higher than the stepped price 
(Norwegian Pharmacy Association, 2015, pp. 36-37). 
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Table 3: Patient expenses with and without reservation 
 
Maximum 
price 
Co-payment 
(38%) 
Reimbursement 
by national 
insurance (62%) 
Extra payment with patient 
reservation (for an unchanged 
maximum price) 
Total patient payment: co-
payment + extra payment 
 Patient reservation 
Brand drug before 
generic competition 
1000  380 620 0 380 + 0 = 380 
Stepped price with 
31% price reduction 
664 252 412 336 252 + 336 = 588 
Stepped price with 
81% price reduction 
220 84 137 780 84 + 780 = 864 
Stepped price with 
90% price reduction 
131 50 81 869 50 + 869 = 919 
 Doctor reservation 
Brand drug after 
generic competition 
1000 380 620 
 
380 + 0 = 380 
(Norwegian Pharmacy Association, 2015, p. 37)   
 
There are not many medical justifications to prefer a branded drug to a generic; NOMA 
(2015a) lists a few: - The patient already uses various types of medicines, and might have trouble 
maintaining control of the different types. - The patient has had an allergic reaction when using generic version before. 
Several studies have shown that the above-mentioned reasons are fairly rare, but nonetheless 
highly valid. In an extensive literature review of all relevant publications on the subject 
between 2000 and 2011, Håkonsen & Toverud (2012, p. 28) found that “between 8-34% of 
patients reported poorer effects and/or new side effects after a change”. Compliance to 
administered drug use has also been shown to negatively correlate with the use of generics 
(Håkonsen, Eilertsen, Borge, & Toverud, 2009). This underlines the importance of good 
information to patients, and the use of reservation against substitution by doctors in cases 
where substitution can lead to non-compliance. 
The variation in reservation between physicians however, suggests that many reservations are 
not grounded in medical considerations. In our data (cf. Chapter 4), we can see from Figure 1 
that most GPs have reservation rates below, or close to the mean reservation for all GPs. 
There is however a non-trivial amount of GPs with reservation rates well above the mean. 
 8 
  
A recent report by the Norwegian Health Economics Administration (HELFO) (2015a), 
discovered in a micro-study large disparities between physicians; for reservations made by 15 
GPs, only 34% of the reservations complied with guidelines. This suggests that there might 
be other reasons than medical considerations that explain variations between doctors.  
 
2.3 Marketing 
Marketing of pharmaceuticals in Norway is regulated through the Regulations of 
Pharmaceuticals (Ministry of Health and Care Services, 2010). Although the regulations are 
fairly restrictive, some leeway is given to the pharmaceutical industry in promoting their 
products. All marketing of prescription-only medicines (POMs) towards patients is 
prohibited. However, pharmaceutical companies can promote these medicines through 
channels where health personnel are the sole recipients of this information – e.g. health 
journals/periodicals, visits from pharma sales reps, sponsoring of conferences etc. NOMA 
audits these activities through inspections and the gathering of statistics, and has the 
opportunity to sanction violations of the regulations.  
 
2.4 Pharmacies 
Pharmacies are the main dispensers of drugs in Norway. As of 2014 there were 800 
pharmacies of which 33 were hospital pharmacies (Norwegian Pharmacy Association, 2015, 
p. 4). Until a regulatory amendment in 2001, all pharmacies were individual enterprises. The 
Figure 1: Variation in reservation between GPs 
 9 
amendment opened for wholesalers to vertically integrate with pharmacies, forming 
pharmacy chains. Today, the pharmaceutical market in Norway is dominated by three such 
chains19 (Norwegian Pharmacy Association, 2015, pp. 10-11). Wholesalers negotiate prices 
with the pharmaceutical companies. This often leads to different mark-ups on both generics 
and branded drugs between different pharmacies depending on their vertical integration.  
 
 
 
19 Alliance Boots, Celesio AG/McKesson Coorporation and Apotek 1 Gruppen/Phoenix 
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3 Theoretical framework 
 
3.1 Literature review 
What motivates physicians, and to whom do they act as agents? 
In order to understand prescription behaviour amongst GPs, one must understand what 
motivates them and what induces them to perform certain tasks. Eisenberg (1986) argues that 
doctors are motivated from a wide range of sources, including financial self-interest, concern 
for the social good and concern for their patients. There has been extensive research on the 
subject (see e.g. Holte et al (2015), Lundin (2000)) 
 
Arguably, a GP’s preferences towards performing a given task will be determined by his 
motivations, but also be subject to the regulatory environment in which he acts. These 
preferences turn into degrees of agency towards the third-part payer and the patient, which 
again will decide the service provision of the physician. In other words, motivation does not 
decide service provision alone, context matters. 
  
In psychology, it is common to distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. 
Intrinsic motivation leads to actions that are based on the rewards of inherent satisfaction, 
whilst extrinsic refers to behaviour that is instrumental to a separate consequence (Ryan & 
Deci, 2000). In economics, incentives are often viewed from an extrinsic perspective; a 
simple example would be performing a task for money. A public health planner looking to 
increase efficiency among physicians, might therefore introduce a regulatory environment 
that makes their income more dependent on the amount of services they provide. Frey & 
Jegen (2000) has however shown that such extrinsic motivation can crowd out intrinsic 
motivation, and thereby dampening the effect of the incentive. Hence, the regulatory 
environment, or market conditions, in which a doctor operates, will affect his preferences and 
in turn what he does. These regulations are put in place to serve various interests, of which 
the most important are those of payer, and those of the patient. In this scheme the doctor 
Motivation Regulatory environment Preferences Agency Service provision 
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serves as a “double agent” for both the payer and the patient, with their interests often 
conflicting (Lundin, 2000).  
 
Ellis & McGuire (1990) elaborate on the agency problem mathematically, arguing that 
physicians maximize a utility function that is contingent on both personal income and patient 
welfare. At a certain point, physicians are faced with a trade-off between higher income, and 
increased patient welfare. The degree of agency the doctor displays towards his patients is in 
their model determined by how much he values his patients benefit – or by using the words of 
Arrow (1963); how altruistic the doctor is.  
 
In reading the ethical guidelines of the Norwegian Medical Association (2015) the agency 
problem becomes more apparent. In the preamble of the guidelines it is stated that “the doctor 
shall help the sick regain their health”, but also that “the doctor shall take societal expenses 
into consideration when performing his duties”. The first can be argued represent agency 
towards the patient, and based on the intrinsic motivation of any doctor – they want to make 
their patients as healthy and happy as possible. This might however be in conflict to the latter 
guideline, where the doctor acts more as an agent for the third party payer than the patient. 
Taking societal expenses into consideration can be thought of as intrinsic motivation, but also 
extrinsic if policymakers introduce regulatory frameworks to incentivize such considerations.  
 
Inducing doctors to do more, and more of the “right tasks”, was one of the reasons for 
introducing Fastlegeordningen in 2001, a structural change in the organization of GPs. 
Amongst others, the reform has made GP-income more contingent on the amount of tasks 
they perform and the amount of patients they are responsible for. Dissatisfied patients can 
therefore translate into loss of income for the GP. According to Norheim & Carlsen (2003) 
the reform has led to increased patient pressure in referrals, thereby reducing the gatekeeper 
function of GPs. Arguably, the reform has contributed to reducing GP-influence, in favour of 
patients getting their will. Put differently; more of the physicians “agency” is directed 
towards the patients’ interests than those of the third party payer. Moreover, studies have 
shown that patients’ confidence in their GPs has been reduced. In studying patient 
perceptions over time, Godager et al (2009) found that patients were less satisfied with their 
relationship to their GP and less content about their GPs medical knowledge, since the 
introduction of the reform.  
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For pharmaceuticals, a shift in agency may have led to more patients getting the prescription 
they prefer – e.g. a doctor reservation against generic substitution. Since a non-trivial amount 
of a GP’s income is capitation-based, every dissatisfied patient that decides to change GPs 
constitutes an income-loss. The GP will therefore have an incentive to give in to patient 
demand. However, this willingness will depend on what emphasis a given GP places on 
personal income, patient-welfare and societal expenses, amongst others. In terms of what 
motivates a GP to write a reservation note, I will depict the argument through set of 
equations, drawing on the framework of Ellis & McGuire (1990). They use the model with 
respect to the amount of tasks that a physician performs, but the arguments still holds when 
applying it to generic reservations. The main addition I make, is introducing income as a 
function of patient benefit.  
 
3.2 The models 
A GP’s utility from the proportion of reservations 𝑋𝑋 is given by the function 𝑈𝑈(.) in equation 
(i). Increasing the proportion of prescriptions that contain a reservation note is contingent on 
the patients’ utility from treatment 𝐵𝐵(. ), the GP’s income 𝜋𝜋(. ) and the societal expenses 
𝑆𝑆(.). All the functions are increasing in 𝑋𝑋. 𝑆𝑆(.) is negative, with reference to the earlier 
mentioned ethical guidelines of the Norwegian Medical Association. The corresponding 
constants, 𝛼𝛼, 𝑙𝑙 and 𝑘𝑘 are positive, and refer to the emphasis a given GP puts on the different 
elements in his utility function. 
i) 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖(𝑋𝑋) = 𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵(𝑋𝑋) + 𝑙𝑙𝜋𝜋 − 𝑘𝑘𝑆𝑆(𝑋𝑋) 
The income function 𝜋𝜋(. ) is given by the revenue 𝑅𝑅 from capitation, which is a function of 
𝐵𝐵(. ). We will call this function 𝐺𝐺(𝑋𝑋). This is done to capture the fact that the GP needs to 
keep his patients satisfied in order for them not to switch GPs. The fee-for-service part of the 
GP’s income is ignored in this equation, since the reimbursement rate from the state does not 
vary across brand/generic drugs. To simplify the equations, income is thus given by.   ii)  𝜋𝜋 = 𝑅𝑅(𝐵𝐵(𝑋𝑋)) = 𝐺𝐺(𝑋𝑋) 
The maximization problem for the GP is to choose the optimal proportion of generic 
reservation.   iii)  𝑈𝑈(𝑋𝑋) = 𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵(𝑋𝑋) + 𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐺(𝑋𝑋) − 𝑘𝑘𝑆𝑆(𝑋𝑋) 
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max 𝑈𝑈  𝑤𝑤. 𝑟𝑟. 𝑡𝑡 .𝑋𝑋 
After derivation and some algebra, we get the first order condition of the GP20 
iv) 𝜶𝜶𝑩𝑩′(𝑿𝑿) + 𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍′(𝑿𝑿) = 𝒌𝒌𝒌𝒌′(𝑿𝑿) 
Equation (iv) tells us that for a marginal increase in doctor reservation, the increase in patient 
benefit and the GP’s income must be equal to the increase in societal costs. This will however 
depend on how much the GP values the increase in patient benefit, both from an altruistic (𝛼𝛼) 
and an income (𝑙𝑙) perspective, relative to how much he values societal expenses (𝑘𝑘). 
Accordingly, we observe that the proportion of reservation is a function of the GP’s 
preferences. 
v) 𝑿𝑿∗ = 𝑿𝑿∗(𝜶𝜶,𝒍𝒍,𝒌𝒌) 
These preferences can differ depending on context, regulatory framework, market conditions 
or characteristics of the GP (e.g. age, sex, specialist). To see how a change in these 
preferences affects the chosen proportion, we calculate the change in 𝑋𝑋 for a marginal 
increase in either preference through first order conditions21. 
Increase in altruism Increased weighting of income Increased weighting of societal expenses 
𝝏𝝏𝑿𝑿
𝝏𝝏𝜶𝜶
> 𝟎𝟎 𝝏𝝏𝑿𝑿
𝝏𝝏𝒍𝒍
> 𝟎𝟎 𝝏𝝏𝑿𝑿
𝝏𝝏𝒌𝒌
< 𝟎𝟎 
These equations tell us, ceteris paribus, that the proportion of reservation is increasing in 𝛼𝛼 
and 𝑙𝑙, and decreasing in 𝑘𝑘.  
 
The above results show what impacts the GP’s choice of proportion of reservation for their 
entire patient population. Equivalently, the discrete choice a GP makes between reservation 
and non-reservation can be modelled for every prescription. Drawing on Green (2005, pp. 
684-685) a random utility model is applied, reflecting the discrete choice of the GP. (vi) is the 
GP’s utility of choosing a generic prescription, which is equal to an unobserved variation 𝜀𝜀𝐺𝐺 , 
20  
 𝑈𝑈′(𝑋𝑋) = (𝛼𝛼 + 𝑙𝑙)𝐵𝐵′(𝑋𝑋) −𝑆𝑆′(𝑋𝑋) = 0 
We assume that 𝐵𝐵′(𝑋𝑋) is concave, 𝑆𝑆′(𝑋𝑋) is convex. The second order condition for an 
interior solution is fulfilled; i.e. (𝛼𝛼 + 𝑙𝑙)𝐵𝐵′′(𝑋𝑋) − 𝑘𝑘𝑆𝑆′′(𝑋𝑋) < 0 
21 We assume that the second order condition for an interior solution is fulfilled. See 
Appendix B for derivation and proof 
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known only to the GP himself. (vii) is the GP’s utility from making a reservation, and thereby 
choosing the brand drug. With the same notation as earlier, this is a function of added patient 
benefit, income and societal costs, in addition to the unobserved variation 𝜀𝜀𝐵𝐵 . vi) 𝑈𝑈(𝐺𝐺) = 0 + 𝜀𝜀𝐺𝐺 vii)  𝑈𝑈(𝐵𝐵) = 𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵 + 𝑙𝑙𝜋𝜋 − 𝑘𝑘𝑆𝑆 + 𝜀𝜀𝐵𝐵 
The probability of making a reservation in (viii) is contingent on the preferences of the GP. 
The necessary condition for the GP to reserve, is therefore that the utility of using a 
reservation is larger than for non-reservation: 𝑈𝑈(𝐵𝐵) > 𝑈𝑈(𝐺𝐺). The solution to the reservation 
problem is thus given by equation (ix). 
viii)  𝑃𝑃(𝑌𝑌 = 1|𝛼𝛼, 𝑙𝑙, 𝑘𝑘) = 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑈𝑈(𝐵𝐵) > 𝑈𝑈(𝐺𝐺)) 
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵 + 𝑙𝑙𝜋𝜋 − 𝑘𝑘𝑆𝑆 + 𝜀𝜀𝐵𝐵 − 𝜀𝜀𝐺𝐺 > 0|𝛼𝛼, 𝑙𝑙, 𝑘𝑘) ix) 𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷(𝜶𝜶𝑩𝑩+ 𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍 − 𝒌𝒌𝒌𝒌 + 𝜺𝜺 > 𝟎𝟎|𝜶𝜶, 𝒍𝒍,𝒌𝒌) 
As for the case of proportion, we see that the choice for the GP is a function of patient 
benefit, personal income and societal expenses. His corresponding preferences will determine 
the choice-outcome, in addition to the unobserved variation 𝜀𝜀. This term represents factors 
that could make a GP more inclined to choose either prescription.  
 
There are many other justifiable reasons and explanations for making a generic reservation 
that were not discussed explicitly through the equations above; e.g. personal beliefs, 
marketing, habits etc. Although being a simplified example, the above findings show how 
important doctor characteristics, or preferences are, when weighing different considerations 
before determining whether or not to make a reservation. These preferences, which also 
reflect the GP’s agency, can be thought of as expressed through the different weights given to 
the constants, 𝛼𝛼, 𝑙𝑙 and 𝑘𝑘. There are many reasons as to why they might differ between GPs, 
and I will now consider a few of them.   
 
Competition 
Patients who do not get the treatment or prescription they desire, have the opportunity to shop 
around for a more accommodating GP. This opportunity will however depend on the 
competitive forces in their municipality, or GP-catchment area.  
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In a capitation system, a patient switch translates into an income loss for the GP. The GP’s 
ability to recuperate this income through adding new patients to the list will depend on the 
competitive environment. The argument goes that GPs in a competitive environment are 
more preoccupied with pleasing their patients because a switch is easy for the patient, and 
costly to the GP.  With respect to our model, increased competition can take the form of a 
larger reduction in utility from an income-loss (large 𝐺𝐺′(𝑋𝑋))22. Equivalently, the doctor can 
become more responsive towards the patient from an income motive (large 𝑙𝑙). 
 
Godager et al (2015) studied the effect of competition on the gatekeeping role of physicians 
in terms of referrals to specialist care. Amongst others, they hypothesized that increased 
competition would lead to an escalation in referrals out of fear of losing patients from their 
lists – a retention effect. In their empirical results, however, they only found weak support. 
They concluded that this might be due to an offsetting effect, namely from doctors limiting 
referrals to make up for the income loss by performing more of the services themselves. In 
our case of generic reservations, however, the latter effect is presumed to be irrelevant as 
neither form of prescription is expected to lead to more follow-up consultations than the 
other.  
 
A possible opposing effect from increased competition is the GP’s ability to convince the 
patient of the generic’s equivalence. If the GP’s patient list has a large deficit compared to his 
desired list ceiling, one could argue that he has the opportunity to spend more time on each 
patient. Since convincing is time-consuming, a GP with many patients in line might discount 
the increased societal costs from reservation relative to his income loss from treating less 
patients. In a literature review, Dugdale et al (1999) showed that less time per patient is 
associated with both a higher frequency of referrals and more use of prescription medicines. 
Although not explicitly discussed in their article, these findings can indicate that busy GPs 
are more responsive to patients’ demand.     
 
Price differences 
In any third-party payer system, the effects of prices on health care are modest in curbing 
unwanted behaviour. This is because doctors do not face any direct costs in prescribing a 
22 If we assume that income has increasing returns on utility at a decreasing rate (concave), 
the utility loss will be larger for GPs with a large patient-shortage compared to those who 
are close to their patient ceiling.  
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certain medicine, and patients only pay a share of the costs. This may lead to 
overconsumption of a good since the user does not bear the full cost of treatment – a situation 
of moral hazard, as defined by Pauly (1968). If a patient is unhappy with a generic 
prescription, he will however need to pay the entire added cost (cf. subsection 2.3.3). The 
size of this added cost, or price difference between generics and branded drugs, might 
therefore affect willingness among both doctors and patients to make a reservation.  
 
Prices can affect generic reservation levels both directions in terms of reservation. One 
hypothesis is that, ceteris paribus, for a larger price difference patients will exude more 
pressure on GPs to file a reservation note in order to avoid the added cost themselves. In the 
model, this can translate into a larger increase in patient utility from being granted a 
reservation from the GP (large 𝐵𝐵′(𝑋𝑋)). Contrary, a large price difference might make the GP 
more attentive to containing societal costs, and limiting unnecessary reservation. In a 
comparison of UK- and Italian GPs’ prescribing behaviour, Hassel et al (2003) found that 
societal cost containment was a significant consideration in choice of prescription to their 
patients. Correspondingly, our model would predict a large 𝑆𝑆′(𝑋𝑋). Depending on whether the 
GP places more weight on societal than patient concerns, the price-effect can therefore work 
both ways.   
 
Previous studies using Norwegian data show that the effect of price difference is limited at 
most. Dalen et al (2011) show a negative effect of price differences on reservation levels, 
with the effect being fairly volatile across the years studied. In comparing older generic 
markets with markets that had recently received generic competition, they found the effect of 
price to be weaker for the latter. In studying the Swedish pharmaceutical market, Lundin 
(2000) finds that a higher price difference increases generic prescriptions by physicians. 
Since Swedish patients have to pay the added cost of a brand drug out of pocket, Lundin 
interprets the findings as a sign of physician agency in favour of the patient. Put differently, 
the physician cares more about costs incurred by the patient than those by the state (𝛼𝛼 > 𝑘𝑘), 
indicating moral hazard. A way of interpreting the findings is that GPs do not care too much 
about prices per se, but about their patients’ contentment of the services provided – both out 
of a wish to please their patients, and from an income perspective. If true, this would in our 
model translate into higher values on the constants 𝛼𝛼 and 𝑙𝑙, relative to that of 𝑘𝑘. 
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Pharmacies also play an important role concerning generic switching. Because the 
differences in mark-ups on generics and brand-drugs can be substantial, pharmacies will have 
an incentive to push either one on the basis of maximizing income. Brekke et al (2013) found 
in their study of Norwegian pharmacies, that there was a strong, positive effect between 
market share of a generic and the difference in generic and brand margins. This led them to 
conclude that a pharmacist’s agency towards the patient is contingent on potential added 
payoff. In Norway, it is commonly the case that pharmacies have higher margins on generics 
than brand-drugs.  
 
Habits and confidence 
GPs encounter, on average, more than 70 patients every week23. Since many of their patients 
face similar medical problems, it would not be surprising if the GP had a certain disposition 
to duplicate advice or prescriptions made to former patients, even if the cases differ slightly. 
One could say that the GP, to some extent, acts out of habit. Furthermore, in prescribing a 
drug more often and to a wide range of patients, a GPs confidence in therapeutic choices 
might be reinforced.   
 
In terms of reservation, an example would be that GPs with a patient population that justifies 
a high degree of reservation (e.g. elderly), translates their prescription pattern to other 
patient-groups. This is discusses by Hellerstein (1998) in her article on prescription decisions 
among physicians. In addition to the hypothesis on patient population, she argues that older 
physicians might be more prone to continue prescribing the branded version: if a given 
physician prescribed a drug for the first time before it had gone off-patent, path dependency 
could lead the physician to maintain his prescription pattern after the patents expiration date 
and generic entry (Hellerstein, 1998, p. 123). Her data does not allow for a thorough testing 
of the hypotheses, but the results clearly states that doctors with older patient population use 
more branded drugs, although with insignificant results regarding the physician’s age. On the 
other hand, even if GPs do not pay attention to whether or not an active ingredient has gone 
off patent, their patients might. If so, the patient’s habit of using a certain brand, might lead 
him to exert pressure on his GP to make such a reservation.  
  
23 http://tidsskriftet.no/article/2237928: Average number of consultations per GP per year is 
3400. With 5 weeks of vacation, this means 3400/47 = 72 consultations /week 
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The argument of habit-formation is also expected to depend on the frequency of prescriptions 
a doctor makes of a given active ingredient. Repetition of behaviour is likely to reinforce 
habit. Whether or not this repetition takes the form of increased or decreased reservation is 
hard to say. Since non-reservation is far more normal, we would however, be inclined to 
suggest that this definition of habit leads to decreased reservation. Equivalently, an increasing 
amount of prescriptions made for a given drug will presumably make the GP more confident 
in its effectiveness. From a confidence perspective, a higher frequency of prescriptions might 
therefore make the GP more persuasive in the eyes of the patient. If true, this may result in a 
smaller increase in patient benefit from receiving a brand drug (small 𝐵𝐵′(𝑋𝑋)). 
Correspondingly, a confident doctor might have less sympathy for patients’ demand for the 
brand version, resulting in a lower agency parameter 𝛼𝛼. From a habit perspective, path 
dependency can be captured in our discrete choice model (ix) by a small residual 𝜀𝜀. 
 
Coscelli (2000) used a rich dataset with both doctor- and patient-level data to study habit 
formation among GPs in Italy. At the time, brands were not allowed to compete through 
pricing. The dependent variable of his analysis was whether or not a patient was prescribed a 
different brand for a given molecule compared to last prescription. To show that habit-
formation was indeed explaining prescription behaviour, he found that doctors who 
prescribed a certain brand more often also had fewer switches. Although not discussed in his 
article, this might also be interpreted as confidence in using a given brand. While not testing 
generic reservation, Coscelli’s findings indicate that GPs have strong preferences in 
prescribing.  
  
Marketing 
It is well established that the pharmaceutical industry seeks to influence doctors in their 
prescription behaviour. What is also well known, is that they often succeed. In their seminal 
article “… There’s No Such Thing as a Free Lunch”, Orlowski & Wateska (1992) studied the 
effects of a pharma-sponsored symposium to a holiday destination, on doctors’ prescription 
behaviour in the US. Despite that the majority of doctors attending doubted that the trip 
would affect their behaviour, a substantial and significant increase in prescription of the 
sponsor’s drugs was observed in the wake of the symposium.  
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In Norway, the marketing of pharmaceuticals is more heavily regulated than in the above 
case (cf. Section 2.3). In a survey of Norwegian doctors and their relationship to the 
pharmaceutical industry by Aasland & Førde (2004), 70% responded that further education 
would suffer in absence of the industry. Additionally, 52% said that doctors were indeed 
influenced by marketing. Interestingly, younger doctors were also found to be more sceptical 
towards the industry, supporting other research that has found higher generic reservations 
among older GPs.  
 
In our model, marketing towards a GP can be captured by a large residual 𝜀𝜀. Additionally, 
marketing can persuade the GP that the health outcome of his patients is more tied to 
receiving a brand-drug, resulting in a higher agency parameter 𝛼𝛼. In other words, a GP who 
does not regard generics as equivalent in terms of effectiveness, will more highly value the 
patient’s benefit from receiving a brand drug.  
 
Perceptions about generics 
Even with clear guidelines in place about which circumstances deem generic reservation 
necessary, there is some leeway for GPs to exude personal convictions.  
 
In a study of US physicians by Shrank et al (2011), about half of the respondents agreed, or 
somewhat agreed to the statement: “I am concerned about the quality of generic 
medications”. There are many reasons why this number should be lower in a Norwegian 
setting, but it clearly indicates that there is a non-trivial number of GPs who have second 
thoughts about the substitutability of branded drugs for generics. In the same study, it was 
also shown that the age groups 35-54 and 55-and-above, were respectably 2.42 and 2.68 
times more likely to report negative perceptions about the efficacy of generic drugs than the 
younger physicians. The authors hypothesized that the findings might be due to training 
environment; medical students today are to a larger extent exposed to generic drugs than 
what was the case some years ago. Although not discussing training environment explicitly, 
Dalen et al (2011) also found some support for there being different attitudes towards 
generics across age groups. In using data from the Norwegian Prescription Database, they 
found that older GPs used reservation more often.  
 
Doctors who are inclined to prefer a brand version drug will presumably need more 
conviction in the form of information of the generic’s therapeutic equivalence for them not to 
 20 
make a reservation. This gathering of information can be conceived as a time-cost to GPs. 
Hellerstein (1998) argues that any positive costs to the GP in learning about generics, will 
lead him to underinvest in this knowledge24. Even if the GP is convinced about generics 
efficacy, their patients might not be. Studies have shown that many patients perceive generics 
as inferior to brand drugs (i.e. Ganther & Kreling (1999) and Håkonsen & Toverud (2012)). 
If true, the argument of time-costs can be translated into explaining the equivalence to 
patients. The less convinced patients are (and the more GPs value their utility), the more 
costly it will be for GPs to explain the safety/efficacy of generics.  
 
In terms of our model, characteristics of GPs (age, sex, specialty) can influence their attitudes 
towards generics, and accordingly their agency, 𝛼𝛼. Time costs are not explicitly present in the 
utility functions (i) and (vi), but can be captured by the preference parameter, 𝑙𝑙: if you are 
willing to use time in explaining generic equivalence, you also care less about your income 
(small 𝑙𝑙). Moreover, a well-informed GP (e.g. a specialist) might also be perceived as more 
confident. This would in turn have similar effects as described earlier.  
 
3.3 Research questions 
As should be clear from the literature review and the model, there are several factors that can 
explain different reservation rates among GPs. Arguably, these factors can in broad be 
examined through either one of two dimensions: personal characteristics (of GPs) and 
market conditions. These two dimensions will also make up the foundation of the research 
questions investigated in this thesis. There are many research questions that can fall under 
these dimensions, and several have been studied in depths previously. The ones chosen in this 
thesis reflect what we consider to be of most interest and what our data permit to investigate. 
Moreover, we will also look more closely on how reservation rates among patients affect the 
corresponding rates of their GPs.  
 
 
 
 
24 In her article that is based on the US market, she assumes that the patient prefers the 
generic drug due to cost-savings. If a Norwegian patient has any preference towards the 
brand version, the argument would be reversed due to third-party payment.  
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Personal characteristics 
Some personal characteristics of the GPs are easily observable to the researcher. As discussed 
in Chapter 3, GPs with similar characteristics are also likely to exhibit related preferences in 
prescription behaviour.  
 
Research questions - Do factors like age, sex and whether or not the GP is a specialist in family medicine 
affect reservation levels?  - Does habit formation and increased confidence in the use of different active 
ingredients help explain a decision to use reservation or not? 
 
Market conditions 
One GP’s choices and professional environment is not isolated from what other GPs do, and 
what medical tools are available. Treatment decisions, or decisions to use reservations in our 
case, is therefore likely to be influenced by factors exogenous to the GP.  
  
Research questions - Are there differences in reservation levels depending on whether or not the generic 
market for that active ingredient is old or new?  - Does increased competition between GPs for patients reduce the gatekeeper function 
of GPs, and in our case lead to increased reservation? - Are there geographical differences in reservation levels? A previous study by 
Stoinska-Scheider (2011) suggests that centrality of municipalities can serve as a 
proxy for both competition and marketing efforts.  - Do price differences between brand- and generic drugs affect reservation levels? 
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4 Data 
 
After filing an application to the Norwegian Directorate of Health, two datasets were 
retrieved from the following registries; The Norwegian GP Registry (Fastlegeregisteret)25 
and HELFOs electronic system for settlement with pharmacies (hereinafter “HELFO 
registry”). These were merged and formed the basis of the analysis. All data management and 
statistical analysis was performed using the statistical software STATA 14. 
 
In order to base the analysis on a relevant sample, a number of changes had to be made to the 
data from the HELFO registry. Most notably, only drugs that had genuine generic 
competition at the time of prescription were included in the analysed dataset. Genuine generic 
competition is here defined as a situation where a given drug package was on the substitution 
list at the time of prescription, and where there were actual sales of that drug26. To make this 
extraction, every drug package included in the dataset was checked against sales records from 
Farmastat27 and the substitution list in NOMA’s drug database Athene. Moreover, since 
dispensing of drugs can take place long after the prescription has been made, it is hard to 
make any solid assumptions about whether or not there was genuine generic competition for 
a given package at the time of prescription. This is especially the case for drugs with volatile 
sales.  
 
Together, this meant that a non-trivial amount of drugs within each ATC-group had to be 
excluded from the HELFO registry (1 262 789 observations, 9.43% of total). When merging 
with the GP registry, another 3 367 897 observations were excluded due to unmatched 
observations and irregular numbers. To make sure our results were not biased by choice of 
sample, two separate extractions were made; one main sample where all drugs with sales in a 
given month were included, and one limited sample where only drugs that had sales the entire 
period were included. See appendix C for an explanation of the quite extensive work that had 
to be carried out on sample selection and merging of datasets. 
25 Some municipality- level data from GP registry were retrieved from a publically available 
online-version: https://helsedirektoratet.no/Sider/Statistikk-fastlege.aspx 
26 We do however recognize that even in cases where there are no generic sales, the fact that 
generics are on the substitution list might drive down prices of brand drugs. The choice of 
sample is not expected to affect our main results by much. One exception might be the 
relative effects of indications and ATCs, that are of less interest in this thesis.  
27 Independent database for drug statistics 
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4.1 Choice of active agents 
Most of the active agents were chosen on the background of a previous master thesis written 
by Anna Stoinska-Schneider (2011) in collaboration with NOMA. Her thesis explored similar 
research questions as those posed here, using the ATCs within the indications related to 
GERD, cholesterol and depression. However, the data used in her thesis was retrieved from 
other sources, and contained less detailed information28. Using the same active agents will 
therefore allow for comparison across different datasets. Furthermore, five more ATCs within 
the indications hypertension and migraines were added to the dataset. This was done to allow 
for exploring new research questions related to recent generic market entry. Three of these 
ATCs will, however, not be included in the models in Chapter 6. They will only be discussed 
in the descriptive statistics as “control ATCs” to allow for comparison of ATCs within 
indications.  
 
It is emphasised that the pharmacological effect of the active agents and the disease they treat 
(indication) were not considered when choosing what active agents to analyse. Based on 
information from the U.S. National Library of Medicine (2015), a short overview of the 
different indications is given below. A further overview of the ATCs, indications and 
corresponding data coding is provided in Table 4. 
 
Gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD) is a disease where backflow of stomach acids 
causes heartburn. The drugs Omeprazole, Pantoprazole, Lansoprazole and Ranitidine all treat 
the symptoms of this disease, which in most cases are chronic throughout the life course.   
 
High cholesterol level is a lifestyle disease that can lead to heart attack and stroke. 
Simvastatin and Pravastatin are drugs that lower the production of cholesterol, and thereby 
decrease the probability of blood clots.  
 
Depression can have many root causes. Citalopram, Paroxetine and Escitalopram are all in a 
class of drugs called serotonin reuptake inhibitors. These are antidepressants that help the 
patient maintain mental balance by increasing the serotonin level.  
 
28 Her raw data contained proportions of doctor reservations. When using a binary model, all 
proportions were counted as a ”1”, irrespective of the size of the proportion.   
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Hypertension, or high blood pressure, is associated with a variety of lifestyle risk-factors 
including smoking, alcohol and a low activity level. Amlodipine, Felodipine, Lercanidipine 
belong to the drug class of calcium channel blockers that relax the blood vessels and thereby 
relieving some strain from the heart in pumping the blood.  
 
Migraine headaches do not have well-established causes, but is hereditary. Sumatriptan and 
Zolmitriptan are in a class of drugs called selective serotonin receptor agonist that give pain 
relief from symptoms of migraine attacks. They do this by stopping pain signals going to the 
head through narrowing blood vessels in the head.  
 
 25 
Table 4: Overview of active ingredients and indications 
ATC number ATC name Class Main indication29 Generic competition30 Market-code31 ATC-code Indication-code 
 ATCs in analysis 
A02BC01 Omeprazole Proton pump inhibitors Peptic ulcer/GERD Before 2004 old_drug 0 0 
A02BC02 Pantoprazole Proton pump inhibitors Peptic ulcer/GERD 12.01.2007 old_drug 1 0 
A02BC03 Lansoprazole Proton pump inhibitors Peptic ulcer/GERD 05.01.2005 old_drug 2 0 
A02BA02 Ranitidine H2-receptor antagonists Peptic ulcer/GERD Before 2004 old_drug 3 0 
C10AA01 Simvastatin HMG CoA reductase High cholesterol level Before 2004 old_drug 4 1 
C10AA03 Pravastatin HMG CoA reductase High cholesterol level 10.15.2004 old_drug 5 1 
N06AB04 Citalopram Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors Major depression Before 2004 old_drug 6 2 
N06AB05 Paroxetine Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors Major depression 05.01.2004 old_drug 7 2 
N06AB10 Escitalopram Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors Major depression 03.01.2010 new_drug 8 2 
C08CA13 Lercanidipine Calcium channel blocker Hypertension 08.01.2010 new_drug 11 3 
N02CC03 Zolmitriptan Selective serotonin receptor agonist Migraines 03.15.2012 new_drug 13 4 
 Control ATCs excluded from models 
C08CA01 Amlodipine Calcium channel blocker Hypertension 03.15.2004 9 3 
C08CA02 Felodipine Calcium channel blocker Hypertension Before 2004 10 3 
N02CC01 Sumatriptan Selective serotonin receptor agonist Migraines 06.01.2006 12 4 
 
 
29 Ref: https://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/druginformation.html 
30 Date for substitution group. For single packages of drugs, the date might come at a later time. Overview retrieved from excel document “Oversikt over virkestoff inkludert 
i trinnprissystemet” (NOMA, 2015f)  
31 Later in the statistical part, old and new generic markets will be analyzed separately. 
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5 Statistical analysis 
 
In the statistical analysis, several different models are applied. The reasons for this are 
twofold;  
i) The distribution of the data does not seem to fit the assumptions of any model 
perfectly. This is unsurprising due to the large mass of zeros in the dependant 
variable. Using multiple models can therefore serve as a test of significance.  
ii) All the research questions cannot be tested simultaneously using one single 
model. 
A number of models were considered, including count models (poisson, zero-truncated 
poisson) and other variants of time-series models (between- and random effects32). Different 
transformations of the dependant variable were also studied (log- and exponential 
transformation). The models used in this thesis are based on the dependent variable being 
analysed as either a binary, or aggregated as a proportion. The decision to use the models and 
variables below, was based on theoretical applicability and performance of the different 
models.  
 
5.1 Variables 
Many variables were tested in the models applied. Table 5 below consists of the main 
variables that will be used in the models. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32 As suggested by Green (2005, p 379) Hausman tests were performed to see whether 
random or fixed effects models were most suitable. In every case, the test rejected the 
random effects models. See Appendix E for test outputs.  
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Table 5: Description of variables included in analysis 
Variable name Explanation 
doctor_reservation  Proportion of prescriptions that contained a doctor reservation note. Binary 
variable in probit version, where every observation represents a single 
prescription. 
patient_reservation Proportion of prescriptions that contained a patient reservation note. 
Multiplied by 100 in order to make it easier to interpret. 1 unit increase = 1 
percentage point change. Binary variable in probit version, (=1) if patient 
reservation made.  
GP-characteristics 
specialist Binary indicator variable. (=1) if doctor is a specialist in family medicine. 
age_dummy Ordinal dummy-variable for age of doctor. (=1) if age < 40, (=2) if 40 ≤ age 
< 55, (=3) if 55 ≤ age. 
male Binary indicator variable. (=1) if doctor is male. 
ln_freq_pres_indication 
ln_freq_pres_atc 
ln_freq_pres_new_drug 
ln_freq_pres_old_drug 
Number of prescriptions made for a given 
indication/ATC/old_drug/new_drug by one doctor in a given year.  The 
variable is log-transformed to better fit normality assumptions of models. 
Also it seems more theoretically pleasing to view the change in terms of 
percentages than a marginal increase in prescriptions.  
Market conditions 
comp_municipality Proportion of aggregated GP-list ceiling in one municipality that is filled. A 
larger size of the variable is interpreted as increased competition. The 
variable is multiplied by 100 in order to make it easier to interpret. 1 unit 
increase = 1 percentage point change 
price_difference 
price_difference_indication 
price_difference_new_drug 
price_difference_old_drug 
Difference between average price with and without a reservation note for all 
drugs within one indication/ATC/new_drug/old_drug in a given year.   
indication Dummy variable for what indication the drug is treating. Indication 1 
(cholesterol) is used as baseline. Dummies are listed in table 4 
atc_code Dummy variable for the active ingredient. Dummies are listed in table 4 
year Time variable. Baseline is 2011.  
centrality Categorical variable defined by Statistics Norway33 to capture geographical 
effects. Municipalities are assigned to a category from 0-3 defined on the 
basis of population and public services provision in an area. 0 are the most 
central counties and 3 the least central. Baseline is 0. 
33 
http://stabas.ssb.no/ItemsFrames.asp?ID=5285605&Language=nb&VersionLevel=ClassL
evel   
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 5.1.1 Aggregation of dependent variable 
When applying a binary model, every observation constituted a single prescription as 
presented in the original data. Accordingly, the data did not need much transformation. 
However, for the other models (twopm, linear regression and fixed effects) the dependent 
variable had to be aggregated into proportions for every GP. Figure 2 shows mean reservation 
levels by indication for all ATCs included in the 
raw data from the HELFO registry. In looking 
at the reservation levels, it should be clear that 
the kind of indication and ATC a drug is 
prescribed for, affects the level of reservation. 
This means that whether one uses indications or 
ATCs as dummy variables, will affect the 
results. Choosing either ATCs or indications, 
will accordingly also lead to different sizes of 
the dependent variable in the aggregated 
versions. 
 
To allow for comparison with the results obtained by Stoinska-Schneider (2011), her 
indications were used as the basis for our overall analyses (hereinafter “overall”). This meant 
that an extraction of indications 0, 1 and 3 had to be made from the main sample. In order to 
analyse differences between matured and more recent generic markets, two separate 
extractions were also made on the basis of ATCs for “old” drugs (hereinafter “old”) and 
“new” drugs (hereinafter “new”)34. Figure 3 shows mean reservation rates for “overall”, 
whilst Figure 4 for that of the “old” vs. “new”.  
34 ”Old” drugs include ATCs 0-7. ”New” drugs include ATCs 8, 11 and 13. Distinction was 
based on start of generic competition, as defined as date of substitution group. Revisit 
Table 4 for an overview.  
    atc's 0-13 are grouped within indications 0-4 
 
Figure 2: Aggregation by ATC 
0-4 represent indications. See Table 4 for explanation 
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 Accordingly, aggregation was made on indication for “overall”, and on ATCs for “old” and 
“new”. To allow for a seamless merge with the GP-registry, proportions were depicted 
separately for every year. This means that there are a maximum of five observations for every 
GP, every year in the aggregated version of “overall”; each observation of reservation 
constituting the mean level of reservation for that GP, for a given indication. Equivalently, 
there are respectively 8 and 3 observations for every GP each year when aggregating on 
ATCs for “old” and “new”. The raw dataset used for the descriptive statistics contained 8 564 
136 observations. However, the number of observations included in the analyses differs 
depending on whether we are looking at indications in “overall”, or ATCs in “old” and 
“new”. Since the original data is used in the binary models, these have fewer observations 
than the models that need aggregated data. This becomes clear when looking at Table 6. 
Table 6: Number of observations by type of model and extract from main sample35 
Extracts 
 
 
“Overall” “New” “Old” 
Type of dummy 
used for drugs 
Indications (0-2) ATCs (8, 11, 13) ATCs (0-7) 
Model type Binary Aggregated Binary Aggregated Binary Aggregated 
Maximum 
number of obs. 
per GP 
“Number of 
prescriptions 
made during 4 
years for the 3 
indications” 
(3 indications)        
* (4 years)                   
= 12 obs. 
“Number of 
prescriptions 
made during 4 
years for the 3 
ATCs” 
   (3 ATCs)         
* (4 years)           
= 12 obs. 
“Number of 
prescriptions 
made during 4 
years for the 8 
ATCs” 
(8 ATCs)         
* (4 years)        
= 32 obs. 
Total number of 
obs. 
6 507 305 44 268 1 712 336 35 581 5 319 744 105 588 
35 For an extensive overview of the distributions of observations for the different models and 
samples, see Appendix D 
Figure 3: Mean reservation by indication (overall) 
 
Figure 4: Mean reservation by ATCs and generic 
market entry 
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To sum up, three different analyses will be performed using models where the dependent 
variable is a binary, and where it is aggregated as a proportion. Since the analyses are based 
on different ATCs/indications, separate extracts from the original sample were made, 
explaining the different number of observations.  
 
Lastly, to analyse changes over time, differences within “old” and “new” ATC’s could not be 
accounted for when the fixed effects model36 was applied. This means all ATC’s within “old” 
and “new” were treated as the same. This was done to avoid “repeated values within 
panels”37. Correspondingly, fixed effects models were also run separately for the three 
indications in “overall”.  
 
5.2 Theoretical background for the applied models 
As noted earlier, there are several different statistical methods that will be applied in the 
analysis. A short introduction will be given for each model, keeping in mind that a trade-off 
had to be made between extensiveness of explanations and ease of reading.  
 
5.2.1 Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
In OLS estimation, the sum of squared residuals is minimized. The residual is the difference 
between the actual and the fitted value of the dependant variable we seek to explain, 𝑦𝑦 
(Wooldridge, 2013, p. 30). Equation (x) shows the linear prediction of 𝑦𝑦, with corresponding 
slope coefficients 𝜷𝜷 for every variable 𝑿𝑿 and the intercept 𝛽𝛽0. x)      𝑦𝑦 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝜷𝜷𝑿𝑿+ 𝑢𝑢 
The variable we seek to explain, doctor_reservation, can take on any number between 0 and 
1. In an OLS estimation, however, estimates of the dependent variable are not bounded by 
these limits since increases in X have constant effects (Hill, Griffiths, & Lim, 2012, pp. 588-
589). This might in turn lead to meaningless predictions; e.g. “GP X has a reservation rate of 
– 0.5”. The OLS regression is based on assumptions38 about the dependent and explanatory 
variables and the residuals; amongst other normally distributed error terms. Since the 
36 A discussion of the model specification follows in subsection 5.2.3 
37 A STATA error report arising from multiple observations within one time variable. E.g. 
having separate observations for ATCs within one year for a model.  
38 See Hill et al (2012, pp. 172-173) for list of assumptions.  
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majority of the observations of the dependent variable in our sample are “0”, it is likely that 
the assumptions do not hold. This in turn can lead the model to produce biased estimates. 
However, the model has proven to have strong predictive power, even in cases where one or 
more of the assumptions are violated (Wooldridge, 2013, p. 252). The OLS model will only 
be applied to “overall” to limit the extensiveness of the analysis. It is in any case expected to 
predict similar results as that of the probit model.  
 
5.2.2 Binary response models 
The definition of a binary variable is that it only takes one of two possible values: “0” or “1”. 
Since the dependent variable in our raw data is a binary, the advantage of modelling it 
accordingly seems appropriate. The aim of the binary model is to estimate the probability of 
y being equal to 1, given the observed parameters. As presented by Wooldridge (2013, p. 
584) the general model is given by   xi) 𝑃𝑃(𝑦𝑦 = 1|𝒙𝒙) = 𝐺𝐺(𝛽𝛽0 + 𝒙𝒙𝜷𝜷)     
where G(z) is a function taking values z in the range [0,1]. G(z) is most commonly modelled 
as a logistic function (“Logit”) or as a standard normal cumulative distribution function 
(“Probit”). According to Wooldridge (2013) the probit model is often preferred by 
economists due to the normality assumption of the error term. This is also the model used in 
this thesis. For estimating the Probit and Logit model, maximum likelihood estimation is 
used, thereby accounting for heteroskedasticity (Wooldridge, 2013, p. 587). Accordingly, the 
distributional assumptions that were stricter under OLS regression are now relaxed. Since a 
non-binary variable does not represent a choice in our case, the predicted value needs to be 
translated into a prediction of choice of reservation; “0” or “1”. A general rule explained in 
Wooldridge (2013, p. 591), states that xii)     𝑦𝑦� = �1     ?̂?𝑝 ≥ 0.50     ?̂?𝑝 < 0.5  
, where 0.5 is the chosen critical value. In our case where there is an overall low probability 
of a positive outcome (=1), the model’s ability to predict generic substitution for physician 𝑖𝑖 
is presumed to be weak with such a critical value. 
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5.2.3 Two-part model 
The two-part model (hereinafter “twopm”) has been used for several years, in many different 
versions. I will consider the twopm as described by Belotti et al (2015). The idea behind the 
twopm is providing predictions and marginal effects based on the combined results of a 
binary and a continuous model. The binary model estimates the probability of a positive 
outcome, whilst the continuous model is a regression contingent on a positive value of the 
dependant variable. Accordingly, the model is especially fitting for data containing a large 
mass of zeros in the dependent variable, as this skewness now is accounted for. Using the 
notation of Belotti et al (2015), we see how the dependent variable 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 is predicted.  xiii)  𝑦𝑦𝚤𝚤|�𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖 = (𝑝𝑝𝚤𝚤� |𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖) ∗ (𝑦𝑦𝚤𝚤� |𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 > 0,𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖) 
Equation (xiv) says that the predicted value 𝑦𝑦𝚤𝚤�, for a given value of the covariates 𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖, is the 
product of the probability of a positive value of 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖, and the predicted 𝑦𝑦𝚤𝚤�, given a positive 
value of 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 and the value of the corresponding covariates 𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖.  
 
Which models one chooses to apply in the different parts of the twopm depend on the 
distribution of the data. The binary part consists of either a probit or a logit model, and the 
continuous part either an OLS regression or a generalized linear model (GLM). Based on 
testing different specifications, a probit and a GLM39 will be used in this analysis.  
 
5.2.4 Fixed effects 
One problem our data might cause is that unobserved characteristics of the GP might be 
correlated with the independent variables. If this is the case, it might bias our results. One 
way of dealing with this problem is to account for constant unobservable characteristics of 
GPs that do not change over time. The fixed effects estimator does this by looking at change 
over time within individuals (Hill, Griffiths, & Lim, 2012, p. 542). The fixed effects 
estimator is based on “within transformation”, meaning that we look at deviations from the 
mean of that time period for each individual. By doing this, unexplained variation that is 
constant over time is accounted for. The error term ?̃?𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 of the time-demeaned model in 
39 With the specifications used, the GLM has similar properties as that of the OLS model.  
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equation (xiii)40 does therefore only contain unobserved variation that changes over time 𝑡𝑡 
(Wooldridge, 2013, pp. 484-486). xiv) 𝑦𝑦�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽2𝑥𝑥�2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑥𝑥�3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ?̃?𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
The variables in our dataset are not expected to vary much over time, but the fixed effects 
estimator can in any case give us an idea of how much of the unexplained variation in 
reservation is due to characteristics of that GP.  
 
 
 
 
 
40 Derivation of the time-demeaned model from within transformation: 
Each GP 𝑖𝑖 has the function 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 in time 𝑡𝑡. We can see that the unobserved 
variation is divided between those that are constant 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 and those that change over time 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
The average of the above equation, is equal to 𝑦𝑦�𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1?̅?𝑥𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀?̅?𝑖. When subracting the two 
equations, the constant term 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 disappears and are left with the transformed time-demeaned 
model, as displayed in equation (xiv) 
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6 Results 
6.1 Descriptive statistics 
To see how reservation levels change over time and between ATC’s, some key information is 
provided in Table 7. The three ATCs in bold italics are the control variables, listed here to 
allow for comparison of reservation trends for new ATCs within indications.    
 
Table 7: Doctor reservation in main sample 
  2011 2012 2013 2014 Total 
Ind. ATC docres freq_pres docres freq_pres docres freq_pres docres freq_pres docres freq_pres 
0 0 21.4 % 80 828 21.1 % 82 074 19.6 % 82 451 20.2 % 61 568 20.6 % 306 921 
0 1 0.8 % 183 285 0.8 % 221 706 1.6 % 274 242 1.8 % 243 438 1.3 % 922 671 
0 2 0.7 % 91 677 0.6 % 91 121 1.1 % 91 600 1.3 % 61 782 0.9 % 336 180 
0 3 1.7 % 46 245 2.9 % 48 325 3.8 % 51 565 4.5 % 40 649 3.2 % 186 784 
1 4 2.9 % 819 802 1.9 % 856 238 2.6 % 694 847 1.9 % 561 898 2.3 % 2 932 785 
1 5 16.8 % 52 365 15.6 % 54 051 13.0 % 56 057 10.6 % 37 981 14.2 % 200 454 
2 6 10.6 % 62 612 7.8 % 65 141 5.0 % 83 552 6.0 % 65 619 7.2 % 276 924 
2 7 4.6 % 41 748 3.8 % 38 174 4.7 % 43 391 4.8 % 33 712 4.5 % 157 025 
2 8 4.4 % 278 668 5.8 % 325 158 3.9 % 325 090 3.3 % 258 645 4.4 % 1 187 561 
3 9 13.1 % 164 637 7.8 %  283 596 5.7 %  369 331 5.6 %  272 372 7.3 %  1 089 936 
3 10 9.6 %  45 447 8.5 %  43 767 6.2 %  43 743 5.3 %  30 713 7.6 %  163 670 
3 11 7.8 % 109 980 9.3 % 113 999 9.3 % 126 962 9.3 % 93 461 8.9 % 444 402 
4 12 18.2 % 63 917 16.5 % 63 788 15.4 % 70 839 12.7 % 79 906 15.5 %  278 450 
4 13 -- -- 13.0 % 25 291 14.0 % 29 998 14.5 % 25 084 10.5 % 80 373 
 Total 5.9 % 2 041 211 5.3 % 2 312 429 5.1 % 2 343 668 4.7 % 1 866 828 5.2 % 8 564 136 
 
In the main sample, doctor reservation decreases steadily over time from 5.9% to 4.7%. The 
relative differences between ATCs are not too different in the limited sample (cf. Section 
4.1). A table for the limited sample can be found in Appendix E for comparison41.  
 
When comparing the new drugs42, ATC 8, 11 and 13 within their respective indications, the 
ATCs 11 and 13 have increasing trends as opposed to that of their counterparts: in fact, the 
(bold italic) ATCs 9, 10 and 12 seem to be decreasing. The case is not so clear for ATC 8, 
which follows a flatter trend not too different from its counterparts ATC 6 and 7.  
 
41 The trend is less pronounced in the limited sample. A noticeable difference between the two samples is that reservation levels are higher for the limited sample. This is probably due to many generic competitors being left out of the sample because of their inconsistent market shares over time.  
42 See Table 4 for definition of ”new” vs ”old” drugs.  
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The trends in doctor and patient reservations for the “new” (ATC 13) and the “old” ATC (12) 
within indication 4 (migraines) are illustrated separately below. The former entered into 
generic competition recently. The numbers 1-8 on the X-axis, represent eight half-year 
periods from 2011 to 2014.  
 
For the “old” ATC 12 in Figure 5, doctor reservation is decreasing with patient reservation 
being fairly constant. The “new” ATC 13 in Figure 6 entered into generic competition in 
March 2012, thereby explaining the lack of reservations in the first two half-year periods. 
This graph shows how patient and doctor reservation move distinctly in opposite directions 
from the start of generic competition. Doctor and patient reservation trends for indication 2 
(depression) and indication 3 (hypertension) can be found in Appendix E. The trends for the 
latter are similar to those of indication 4, whilst the trends for depression cannot show the 
same associations.  
 
Age and specialty 
Age shows a strong association with reservation levels: older GPs reserve more often. The 
effect of being a specialist appears negligible at the aggregate level. When looking more 
closely within the age groups, reservation among the oldest GPs is to some extent offset if he 
is also a specialist. This offset is more pronounced for new, than old drugs. Lastly, the 
relative increase in reservation from age is larger for new than old drugs.  
Table 8: Reservation rates depending on GPs’ age and specialist status 
 new drugs old drugs 
 not specialist specialist total not specialist specialist total 
25-44 years 5.47 % 5.34 % 5.44 % 3.64 % 3.44 % 3.60 % 
45-54 years 6.00 % 5.95 % 5.97 % 3.77 % 4.14 % 4.03 % 
>54 years 7.40 % 6.05 % 6.30 % 4.36 % 3.83 % 3.93 % 
Total 6.13 % 5.97 % 6.02 % 3.88 % 3.92 % 3.91 % 
Figure 5: Trend in reservation for ATC 12 
 
Figure 6: Trend in reservation for ATC 13 
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Centrality 
Irrespective of aggregation, doctor reservation shows similar trends over different 
geographical areas. In looking at figures 7 and 8 below, the trend is fairly distinct with 
decreasing reservation the less central the municipality becomes (moving from 0 to 3). 
However, there is a jump in reservation for the most peripheral municipalities conflicting 
with the trend, indicating that the most central and the least central municipalities have the 
highest reservations. Due to this last jump, we cannot find a linear relationship. Because of 
the consistency of the relative differences, we do however note that geographical aspects 
have some relevance. 
  
6.2 Model results 
In order to avoid correlated error terms, all models were clustered on GPs. This is done to 
account for intragroup correlation from the fact that the prescriptions for a given GP are not 
independent from one another (StataCorp, 2013, p. 312). The “robust” option was also 
applied to all models to reduce probability of misspecification. By specifying the models in 
such a way, the standard errors become larger and the confidence intervals alike. This means 
that obtaining significant results becomes harder. However, the findings you do get are more 
reliable.  
 
In order to model the effect of price differences, it was decided to include variations over 
time as a dummy variable (year), instead of performing separate analysis for every year43. 
Because of the extensiveness of models and extracts applied, this makes interpretation of the 
results more manageable. Furthermore, since the difference in price is equal within every 
43 The outputs when modelling for separate years are included in Appendix H.  
Figure 7: Reservation by market entry and centrality 
 
0-3 are degrees of centrality. See Table 5 for explanation    
Figure 8: Reservation by indication and centrality 
 
0-3 are degrees of centrality. See Table 5 for explanation    
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indication for a given year, price difference will automatically be omitted if the analysis is 
performed separately for every year.  
 
Lastly, marginal effects for the probit model were obtained by using average partial effects. 
As pointed out by Wooldridge (2013, p. 591), partial effects at the average is often unfitting 
for calculating marginal effects of a discrete outcome. The goodness of fit measures in Tables 
9-11 gives an idea of the performance of the different models. We want R^2 and Pseudo R^2 
to be as large as possible, whilst AIC (akaike information criterion) to be small. The latter 
serves best to compare models rather than as an absolute measure.  In the fixed effects model, 
“Within“ says how much of the variation in reservation for a given GP is explained by the 
independent variables, whilst “between” refers to the variation between GPs. “Entire model” 
reflects the goodness of fit for the model as a whole (StataCorp, 2013, p. 369). Explanation of 
the results follows in Section 6.4. 
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Table 9: Model results: “Overall” 
 
Regression Probit 
Two-part model 
Probit GLM Combined 
Indep. var. Beta P-val. ME44 Beta P-val. Beta P-val. Beta P-val. Beta P-val. 
ulcer  -0.0264 0.000 -0.0139 -0.1927 0.000 -0.9074 0.000 -0.0266 0.000 -0.0317 0.000 
depression 0.0225 0.000 0.0297 0.2767 0.005 0.4378 0.000 0.0107 0.000 0.0168 0.000 
price_difference -0.0003 0.000 -0.0003 -0.0030 0.000 -0.0056 0.000 -0.0003 0.000 -0.0003 0.000 
male -0.0020 0.085 -0.0034 -0.0398 0.006 0.0128 0.557 -0.0012 0.422 -0.0005 0.637 
age_dummy (2) 0.0036 0.006 0.0040 0.0484 0.012 0.0404 0.124 0.0048 0.005 0.0040 0.001 
age_dummy (3) 0.0047 0.002 0.0034 0.0408 0.082 0.0655 0.027 0.0077 0.000 0.0065 0.000 
comp_municipality -0.0003 0.001 -0.0179 -0.2095 0.063 -0.0047 0.002 -0.0003 0.004 -0.0003 0.000 
ln_freq_pres_year 0.0013 0.097 0.0058 0.0681 0.000 0.6602 0.000 -0.0283 0.000 -0.0047 0.000 
specialist  -0.0003 0.792 -0.0021 -0.0247 0.269 0.0317 0.172 -0.0022 0.144 -0.0008 0.484 
centrality 1 -0.0028 0.035 -0.0056 -0.0665 0.000 -0.0157 0.561 -0.0028 0.083 -0.0022 0.071 
centrality 2 -0.0086 0.000 -0.0148 -0.1951 0.000 -0.1834 0.000 -0.0062 0.020 -0.0079 0.000 
centrality 3 -0.0005 0.748 -0.0043 -0.0500 0.011 0.0807 0.020 -0.0057 0.005 -0.0022 0.160 
2012 0.0021 0.013 -0.0007 -0.0073 0.368 0.0691 0.001 0.0016 0.160 0.0027 0.004 
2013 -0.0106 0.000 -0.0112 -0.1306 0.000 -0.2334 0.000 -0.0109 0.000 -0.0123 0.000 
2014 -0.0101 0.000 -0.0119 -0.1397 0.000 -0.1291 0.000 -0.0157 0.000 -0.0133 0.000 
constant 0.1377 0.000  -0.9890  -0.4194 0.169 0.3164 0.000   
Goodness of fit R^2: 0.0222 Pseudo R^2: 0.0097 Pseudo R^2: 0.1542 AIC:-2.5204  
ME: Marginal effect, Beta: coefficient (which is equal to ME under regression and GLM), P-val: p-value, 
giving the smallest significance level that would lead to rejection of the null hypothesis of the coefficient = 0. A 
common cut-off for deeming coefficients significant is a p-value below 0.05 
44 The marginal effects are calculated using ”average marginal effects” (APE). APE gives 
separate significance levels. These are not included in the output since they generally do 
not differ more than +/- 0.003.   
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Table 10: Model results for “new” vs. “old” drugs 
45 ATCs have been controlled for. With a few rare exceptions, the dummies were all highly significant. 
ME: marginal effect, Beta: coefficient (which is equal to ME in GLM), P-val: p-value, giving the smallest significance level that would lead to rejection of the null hypothesis of 
coefficient = 0. A common cut-off for deeming coefficients significant is a p-value below 0.05 
 
 NEW drugs OLD drugs 
Probit 
TWOPM 
Probit 
TWOPM 
Probit GLM Prediction Probit GLM Prediction 
Independent 
variables45 
ME Beta P-val. Beta P-val. Beta P-val. ME P-val. ME Beta P-val. Beta P-val. Beta P-val. ME P-val. 
price_difference 0.0006 0.0050 0.000 0.0052 0.000 0.0013 0.000 0.0010 0.000 0.0000 0.0001 0.079 0.0008 0.000 -0.0001 0.003 0.0000 0.006 
male 0.0001 0.0013 0.942 0.0033 0.876 0.0090 0.007 0.0047 0.040 -0.0023 -0.0312 0.054 0.0370 0.032 -0.0015 0.661 0.0020 0.189 
age_dummy (2) 0.0082 0.0745 0.001 0.0176 0.511 0.0122 0.006 0.0072 0.013 0.0028 0.0380 0.081 0.0522 0.013 0.0114 0.006 0.0067 0.000 
age_dummy (3) 0.0110 0.0981 0.000 0.0666 0.022 0.0199 0.000 0.0148 0.000 0.0026 0.0351 0.169 0.1012 0.000 0.0147 0.001 0.0110 0.000 
comp_municipality -0.0441 -0.3785 0.007 -0.0045 0.005 -0.0001 0.628 -0.0004 0.026 -0.0147 -0.1957 0.095 -0.0041 0.001 -0.0001 0.809 -0.0003 0.006 
ln_freq_pres_year -0.0049 -0.0425 0.000 0.5579 0.000 -0.1083 0.000 -0.0113 0.000 0.0030 0.0398 0.009 0.4384 0.000 -0.1216 0.000 -0.0080 0.000 
specialist -0.0056 -0.0484 0.022 0.0365 0.113 -0.0118 0.003 -0.0031 0.237 -0.0007 -0.0099 0.658 0.0302 0.088 0.0053 0.120 0.0036 0.021 
centrality 1 0.0002 0.0017 0.935 -0.0198 0.460 0.0069 0.091 0.0019 0.502 -0.0027 -0.0359 0.064 0.0040 0.843 -0.0059 0.109 -0.0015 0.376 
centrality 2 -0.0136 -0.1284 0.000 -0.1470 0.001 0.0141 0.103 -0.0044 0.390 -0.0123 -0.1834 0.000 -0.1392 0.000 -0.0021 0.760 -0.0096 0.001 
centrality 3 0.0020 0.0167 0.619 0.0120 0.747 0.0082 0.236 0.0050 0.267 -0.0058 -0.0796 0.001 -0.0069 0.797 -0.0181 0.000 -0.0060 0.008 
2012 0.0246 0.2082 0.000 0.3978 0.000 0.0334 0.000 0.0456 0.000 -0.0078 -0.1035 0.000 -0.0415 0.000 -0.0159 0.000 -0.0075 0.000 
2013 0.0119 0.1088 0.000 0.0955 0.000 0.0427 0.000 0.0260 0.000 -0.0038 -0.0477 0.000 0.0033 0.787 -0.0148 0.000 -0.0042 0.000 
2014 0.0040 0.0392 0.013 0.1554 0.000 0.0159 0.000 0.0177 0.000 -0.0063 -0.0827 0.000 0.0828 0.000 -0.0336 0.000 -0.0049 0.000 
constant  -3.3998 0.000 -3.9308 0.000 -0.0438 0.537    -0.7184 0.000 -0.8313 0.000 0.7118 0.000   
Goodness of fit R^2: 0.0328 
Pseudo R^2: 
0.1863 
AIC: -0.9208  R^2: 0.1311 
Pseudo R^2: 
0.2420 
AIC: -0.5541  
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 Table 11: Model results for fixed effects 
 
6.3 Goodness of fit and specification46 
6.3.1 Linear regression model 
The regression model was assumed unfitting from the start, but was included to compare 
against the other models. Furthermore, its fairly simple interpretation was appealing. The R-
squared tells us that 2.22 % of the variation in doctor reservations is explained by the 
independent variables (Hill, Griffiths, & Lim, 2012, p. 136). Whether or not this is a good 
result, is hard to say with the independent variables at hand.  
 
A Breuch-Pagan test (httest) was run to test for heteroskedasticity. The test firmly rejected 
the null-hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity (prob > chi2 = 0,000). To account for this we 
used robust standard errors, clustering on GPs. Upon inspecting the corresponding plot of 
residuals vs. fitted values in Figure 9, it is clear that the data indeed does not fulfil the 
assumptions of the model. The residuals seem to be increasing with the fitted values, within a 
boundary. This boundary is probably due to the nature of the dependant variable (0,1). When 
performing a regression with a log-transformed version of the dependent variable, the 
residuals are less biased – as seen in Figure 10. This indicates that the large zero mass of the 
46 For ease of reading, the goodness of fit and specification tests discussed in this section are 
only based on the ”overall” models. Output of tests for ”new” and ”old” are provided in 
Appendix F. These tests gave the same conclusions as for those of ”overall”.  
 Indication 0 Indication 1 Indication 2 Old drugs New drugs 
Indep. var. Beta P-val. Beta P-val. Beta P-val. Beta P-val. Beta P-val. 
price_difference -0.0001 0.023 -0.0002 0.000 0.0006 0.000 -0.0000 0.007 0.0004 0.000 
comp_municipality -0.0001 0.623 -0.0002 0.018 -0.0005 0.001 -0.0001 0.031 -0.0004 0.015 
ln_freq_pres_year -0.0025 0.269 0.0040 0.004 -0.0101 0.002 0.0024 0.148 -0.0012 0.615 
patient_reservation -0.0006 0.000 0.0002 0.558 -0.0012 0.001 -0.0003 0.176 -0.0008 0.000 
constant 0.0713 0.000 0.0881 0.000 -0.0509 0.033 0.0510 0.000 -0.0122 0.623 
R^2 
within 0.0026 0.0145 0.0333 0.0026 0.0101 
between 0.0308 0.0050 0.0018 0.0041 0.0005 
entire model 0.0142 0.0067 0.0081 0.0036 0.0006 
Beta: estimated coefficient and marginal effect, P-val: p-value, giving the smallest significance level that would 
lead to rejection of the null hypothesis of coefficient = 0. For the reasons mentioned in subsection 5.1.1, the 
models run for each indication 0-3 are samples from the aggregated version of “overall”. A common cut-off for 
deeming coefficients significant is a p-value below 0.05 
 
 41 
                                                 
dependent variable affects the model undesirably. Since the log-transformed version creates 
many missing observations, the corresponding interpretation changes. Furthermore, as the 
GLM part of the twopm has a similar foundation47, it was chosen to not use the log-version 
for the OLS regression.  
 
The Ramsey test for omitted variables was also performed, with the null-hypothesis of no 
omitted variables being firmly rejected (prob > F = 0,000). To test for multicollinearity, a 
VIF-test was run. This stated that no multicollinearity was sufficiently present for any of the 
variables, except for indication 2, and price difference48.  
 
To conclude, it should be fairly well established that a linear regression model is somewhat 
unsatisfactory to employ on this dataset with the current modelling of variables. For the 
reasons already mentioned, the results will still be included.  
 
6.3.2 Probit model 
The (McFaddens) pseudo R-squared in the probit has a slightly different interpretation 
compared to the R^2 in the OLS model. Higher values of the Pseudo R^2, like in the OLS 
indicates better fit49.  All others things equal, adding more independent variables increases 
this measure. This would therefore help explain why the Pseudo R^2 is larger for “old” than 
that of “overall” and “new”50.  
47 The GLM in the twopm only predicts reservation given that reservation has taken place.  
48 See Appendix F for output and explanation.  
49 See link for a thorough discussion of R^2: 
http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/output/Stata_Probit.html 
50 For capturing the effect of drug type, ”main” has 3 dummies (indications), ”new” 3 (ATCs) 
and ”old” 7 (ATCs) 
Figure 9: Residual plot for applied model 
 
 
Figure 10: Residual plot for log-transformed 
dependent variable 
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 To see the predictive power of the model, we choose to look at the models ability to predict 
doctor reservations based on the independent variables at hand. If we choose a critical value 
of y_hat > 0,5 (like in subsection 5.2.2) as a condition for a reservation, our model predicts 
zero reservations51. The model’s ability to predict the true cases of reservation, the sensitivity 
of the model, is therefore non-existent. The model’s ability to predict cases of non-
reservation, the true-negative, is however 100%. This is clear when looking at Figure 11.  
 
The lack of predictability is unsurprising, due to the fairly low amount of reservations all 
over. Additionally it is hard to determine which of one GPs prescriptions should contain a 
reservation or not, as there is no way of distinguishing these from one another. If choosing a 
different cut-off point however, say 0.05, we see from Figure 11 that specificity increases and 
sensitivity decreases. The “receiving operating characteristics” (ROC) curve in Figure 12 
shows how the predictive power varies with different cut-offs. The area under the curve is a 
measurement of the models overall predictability (StataCorp, 2013, pp. 1119-1121). In our 
model, this is 0.5835: or 8.35 percentage points better than tossing a coin.  
 
Lastly a Pearson goodness-of-fit test was applied (estat gof) to examine the observed versus 
the predicted number of responses of the model. The test52  did not reject the null hypothesis 
(Prob > chi2 = 0.000) that the data were consistent with the applied distribution (StataCorp, 
2013, pp. 494-495). Together, this leads us to conclude that the model is correctly specified, 
but with weak predictive power.  
51 See Appendix E for output, including with different cut-offs. 
52 See Appendix E for output 
Figure 11: Sensitivity vs. specificity 
 
Figure 12: Predictive power- ROC 
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 6.3.3 Two-part model 
According to Belotti et al (2015, p. 18) the ability to assess the fit of the overall predictions of 
the twopm is limited. By looking at the predictions in Table 12 and comparing to the true 
proportion of doctor reservation, we can however get an idea.   
Table 12: Predictions of twopm 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.  Min Max 
y_hat_twopm 73.371 0.0663068 0.0410831 -0.0610938 0.1742107 
doctor_reservation 73.371 0.0661678 0.1116615 0 1 
 
As we can see, the mean of the predictions, “y_hat_twopm” is almost identical to the true 
mean. Since the theoretical basis of the model chooses coefficients of the independent 
variables to minimize the variation between the predicated and the true reservation level, this 
is therefore unsurprising. The standard deviation is far smaller than the true variation 
however. This is due to the specification of the model in accounting for the large zero-mass 
in the data. Since the predictions of the twopm are not bounded, we can furthermore note that 
it also predicts negative values.  
 
Although the goodness of fit is hard to test for the overall model, the separate parts of the 
probit and the GLM model are easier to assess.  
 
Probit: The pseudo R-squares are higher for the probit model when specified within the 
twopm than what was the case when it stood alone. This is probably because the overall 
proportion of positive outcomes for the dependent variable is higher when it is aggregated on 
GPs. The relative size of the pseudo R-squares across “overall”, “old” and “new” are similar 
to the other probit version, for the same reasons as outlined in subsection 6.3.2.  
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The model’s ability to distinguish between 
reservation and non-reservation is fairly 
good, with an area under the ROC-curve in 
Figure 13 equal to 0.757253. Lastly, a 
Pearson goodness-of-fit test was performed. 
The null hypothesis that the data are 
consistent with the applied distribution, 
could not be rejected (Prob > chi2 = 
0.0000)54. Together, this suggests that the 
modelling is satisfactory.  
 
GLM: Deviance residuals are the equivalent of the residuals in OLS-models, for models that 
use maximum likelihood. According to McCullagh & Nelder (1989), deviance residuals are 
approximately normally distributed if the model is correct. Furthermore, by looking at the 
deviance residuals vs. doctor reservation we can assess the model’s goodness of fit.  
 
As we can see from Figure 15, the deviance residuals show a strong and fairly balanced 
correlation with doctor reservations. As with the predictions from the OLS model, deviance 
residuals can take on negative values contrary to that of what is observed in real life. With 
respect to the distribution of the deviance residuals in Figure 14, we see that the kernel 
density plot in red, to a large extent overlaps the normal distribution in black. The similarity 
is not as strong as one could hope for, but we deem it reasonable enough. Considering the 
53 The mass of zeros is greatly reduced when modelling every positive outcome as 1. This 
likely explains the increased fit.  
54 Output provided in Appendix F  
Figure 14: Distribution of deviance residuals 
 
Figure 15: Goodness of fit (deviance residuals) 
 
Figure 13: Predictive power - ROC 
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goodness of fit separately for the models in twopm, the specification and corresponding 
applicability of the overall twopm seems fitting.  
 
6.3.4 Fixed effects 
The three R-squares in the different fixed effects models in Table 12 tell us that the 
independent variables explain fairly little. This is especially the case if you compare the R-
squares to rho, which say that differences in the unobserved characteristics of the GPs explain 
around 60%. When running fixed effects models, F-tests are automatically computed. These 
test the hypothesis that all coefficients are equal to zero. As we can see in Table 13 this can 
firmly be rejected for all indications. As mentioned earlier, clustering with robust standard 
errors was used to account for heteroskedasticity. When testing the models without such 
specification, heteroskedasticity was present55.  
Table 13: Results from fixed effects models 
 Ulcer (0) Cholesterol (1) Depression (2) Old drugs New drugs 
rho1 0.6406 0.5942 0.5605 0.6425 0.5735 
Prob > F 0.0033 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
For the fixed effects model to produce linear unbiased estimators, a number of assumptions 
need to be fulfilled. To see whether most of the assumptions are satisfied, one can look at the 
distribution of the individual error terms for the GPs56. If they are normal, the specification is 
correct (Wooldridge, 2013, pp. 509-510). We can see from Figure 16 that this is the case for 
indication 0. The other indications show 
similar distributions and are included in 
Appendix F. This suggests that the model 
is fit for analysing the data at hand.  
 
 
 
 
 55 See Appendix F for tests.  
56 The other assumptions that cannot be verified by looking at the distribution are i) random 
sampling and that ii) each explanatory variable changes over time.  
Figure 16: Distribution of error terms 
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6.4  Interpretation 
The most important insight we can draw from the models, is that they give highly consistent 
predictions. In the “overall” models, 10 out of 15 independent variables give significant 
results in all of the models. Of these 10 variables, 9 have the same sign across the different 
models and differ only slightly in terms of size of marginal effects. In the separate models for 
“new” and “old” ATCs, the predictions are equally coherent for the large majority of 
variables. The variables that come out as insignificant, can by and large easily be explained. 
Taking into account the results from “overall”, “old” and “new”, the predictions of the fixed 
effects models are also very close to what we would expect. Before looking more closely at 
the effects separately, some clarification is needed. Since the dependent variable is modelled 
differently in all models, the results have to be interpreted with caution.  
 
The interpretation of the marginal effects varies depending on the variable and model in 
question. For log-transformed variables, a one percentage increase in the independent 
variable is associated with a change in the dependent variable equal to 1/100*coefficient of 
the independent variable57 (Wooldridge, 2013, pp. 713-715). E.g. if the coefficient of 
ln_freq_pres_indication_year = 0.0167, the effect of a 1% increase in the coefficient 
ln_freq_pres_indication_year on doctor_reservation, would be equal to 0.000167 
(=0.0167*(1/100)). The other non-transformed variables are easier to interpret: a one-unit 
increase in the independent variable is associated with a change in doctor reservation equal to 
the size of the coefficient of that independent variable. As noted earlier, the variables on 
competition and patient reservation are multiplied by 100 to make their interpretation more 
intuitive. Here, a one-unit change represents one percentage point increase. If the independent 
variable is a dummy variable, the change is measured relative to the defined baseline58.  
 
There are some further substantial differences between the models in terms of interpretation. 
The regression model and the probit model are fairly similar, but with the former predicting 
proportion of reservation for one GP, and the latter probability that a given GP will make a 
reservation for a given prescription. In terms of the twopm, the combined results are of most 
interest, but the two models that form its base also provide some valuable insight. The probit 
57 Considering the equation 𝑦𝑦 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 log(𝑥𝑥), a rule of approximation states that ∆𝑦𝑦 ≈
� 𝛽𝛽1
100
�%∆𝑥𝑥  
58 See table 5 for overview of variables and corresponding baselines 
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part of the twopm is more biased towards a GP making a reservation59, and thereby showing 
larger marginal effects than what is the case for the other probit model. The GLM model 
predicts reservation given that it has taken place, which also explains why many coefficients 
differ with respect to the probit part of the twopm.   
 
We see that the fixed effects models have fairly small R^2, and that the predicted coefficients 
of the independent variables have small values. Since neither of the independent variables 
included are expected to change much at all, the fact that we have significant, and fairly 
consistent results across indications, is an interesting observation in itself.  
 
Price difference 
Price difference is statistically significant in most of the models. In general the models show 
small negative marginal effects, which was also what Stoinska-Schneider (2011) found. 
When distinguishing between “old” and “new” ATCs, the effects are positive. For the fixed 
effects models, the findings are inconclusive. The sizes of the effects are also small. 
Together, this makes it difficult to make any solid predictions. The relatively weak effect 
from price, and the different signs across the models, might be attributable to the inclusion of 
indications or ATCs as dummy-variables. Since price differences vary between indications 
and ATCs, the dummy variables for indications might capture some of the effect that price 
has on reservation. 
 
Male 
The results for the male-variable are in broad insignificant. The few exceptions have low 
coefficients and point in different directions, which suggests that the sex of the GP does not 
affect reservation.   
 
Age 
Relative to other independent variables examined, age is amongst the best predictors of 
reservation. Both dummies have positive coefficients, and are for the most part highly 
significant. In the few cases where either one of the dummies is not significant, the other one 
is. One observation worth noting is that the two age dummies in “overall” do not differ much, 
whilst the dummy for the oldest age group has consistently higher coefficients when 
59 Since all positive results are counted as 1. 
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differentiating between “old” and “new”. Together, this suggests that GPs aged over 40 have 
a tendency to use reservation more often than younger GPs.  
 
Specialist 
The dummy variable specialist is with a few exceptions, insignificant. However, being a 
specialist is strongly correlated with age (correlation = 0.41). This was also clear in Section 
6.1 when looking at the descriptive statistics. When testing the models, including “specialist” 
as an independent variable did not seem to affect the predictive power of the other 
independent variables. Nevertheless, it is more intuitive that age increases the probability of 
becoming a specialist than the other way around. This does not mean that there cannot be 
differences within age groups (cf. Section 6.1), although our models in general cannot show 
any meaningful association. One exception worth noticing is that for “new” ATCs, being a 
specialist is negatively and significantly associated with reservation levels in the GLM part of 
the twopm.  
 
Competition 
The variable on competition gives good results. It is highly significant in almost all models, 
and its negative sign indicates that increased competition leads to more reservation. Although 
the size of the coefficient is small, the effect is not necessarily week when considering its 
definition in Table 5. E.g. a 10-percentage point change in the competition proportion, leads 
to a 3-percentage point reduction in reservation in twopm model of “overall” in Table 9. Note 
that “new” ATCs has a much larger size of the coefficient than that of “old” ATCs. Together, 
these results suggest that increased competition lead to more reservations, and especially so 
in new generic markets.  
 
Frequency of prescriptions  
Frequency of prescriptions is a highly significant variable in all models in “overall”, “old” 
and “new”, but with altering signs. However, when considering the different interpretations 
of the models, this might not be surprising. When all physicians are pooled together, the 
probability of making a reservation increases with the amount of prescriptions you make. 
This becomes especially clear in the probit part of the twopm. The effect is likely due to the 
fact that many GPs did not make a reservation for one or more active ingredients a given 
year. When looking at the GLM part of the twopm, one can however see that contingent on 
having made a reservation; the proportion of reservations is decreasing in frequency of 
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prescriptions. This is the number that is of most interest, and indicating that confidence in 
generic equivalence, or habit formation leads to fewer reservations. The predictions of the 
combined parts of the twopm give the same result.  
 
In terms of change over time, predictions in the fixed effects models are inconclusive. The 
results are not surprising considering that the initial frequency is not accounted for in these 
models, only the change. Deviations from one GPs mean level of prescriptions are expected 
to be less than deviations of means between physicians. This might provide some explanation 
for the weak effect when looking at change over time.  
 
Indication  
The indication dummies are highly significant in all the models. The general picture is that 
ulcer has lower, and depression has higher rates of reservation than cholesterol. It should be 
clear beyond any doubt, that reservation varies widely over indications.  
 
Year 
With 2011 as the baseline, we see a notable decrease in reservation over time for the year-
dummies in “overall” and “old”. Here, all the dummies are highly significant, with the 
exception of 2012 being slightly insignificant at times. In general, the decrease is also less 
pronounced for 2012 than for the years 2013 and 2014 that show fairly persistent reductions 
in reservation. For “new”, the effect of year works in the opposite direction, with positive and 
significant coefficients.  
 
Patient reservation  
Patient reservation is significant with a negative sign in the fixed effects models, except for 
indication 1 (cholesterol) and “old”. The results therefor imply that patient- and doctor 
reservation are to some extent substitutes. This effect is however much larger for “new” (-
0.0008) than “old” (-0.0003). Together with the observations from the descriptive statistics, 
this suggests that patient and doctor reservation can be substitutes, and especially so in new 
generic markets.  
 
Comparing with other model-specifications and samples  
In general the results are not sensitive to using the limited sample as a base. Unsurprisingly, it 
has more predictive power, either in the form of lower AIC and higher R-squared and Pseudo 
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R-squared. The rise in predictive power is likely due to some of the uncertainty from lag in 
prescription and dispensing of drugs being removed. For the most part, the significant 
variables have the same signs as that of the main sample. The largest difference in using the 
limited sample is that the signs of the year dummies changes from negative to positive. This 
is probably due to the smaller sample, and thereby that the drugs included to a lesser extent 
reflect the true prescription options at hand for the GP. Frequency of prescriptions is negative 
and significant in the limited sample for the probit and OLS models – opposite of what we 
found when using our main sample. A possible explanation is that the drugs that are included 
in the limited sample also are the ones used most frequently by all GPs. If all GPs prescribe a 
drug often, habit and confidence might be more pronounced.  
 
When running the twopm for the different years separately, the models are slightly weaker in 
terms of predictive power. Most notably, the competition variable is only significant for the 
years 2013 and 2014 when running models for “overall”. When performing the analysis 
separately for “old” and “new” ATCs for every year, the results also proved similar to those 
from the main sample. The competition variable was more significant for “new” ATCs than 
for “old”. The latter had a significant competition variable in the years when centrality did 
not, and vice versa. The reduced predictive power of the models might be due to fewer 
observations in the sample, but also that serial correlation is more properly accounted for.  
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7 Discussion 
 
7.1 Strengths and weaknesses 
One factor in the analysis is both the main strength and the main weakness: the extraction of 
the sample. Well over 250 different packages were checked separately against the two 
databases athene and farmastat to determine whether or not generic competition was taking 
place for that package at the time the prescription was made. This means that the sample, 
under the assumptions (cf. Section 4.1), to a large extent reflects the choice context of both 
the doctor and the patient with respect to reservation. The weakness of extraction is 
correspondingly that assumptions had to be made. Accordingly, there is without doubt a 
certain amount of prescriptions where generic reservation was a possibility that were not 
included in the sample. The limited sample, where only packages with sales the entire period 
were included, showed similar results as that of the main sample. This serves as a robustness 
check of the results. However, there will always be the possibility that other assumptions 
could lead to extraction of an even more relevant sample.  
  
There are some key variables lacking that would have improved the analysis. Since the 
justifications for preferring a brand drug are linked to patient characteristics, such data might 
have helped explaining variations between GPs. For example, older GPs tend to have older 
patients, thereby deeming reservation more necessary. Equivalently, sex and residence of the 
GPs might affect the kind of patients they have on their list.  
 
The reasoning for including competition was to examine GPs’ gatekeeper function from an 
income-motive. Data on GPs’ relative preferences towards income versus altruism would 
provide additional insight. This is an emerging research topic (e.g. (Godager & Wiesen, 
2013)) that can prove valuable for understanding a GP’s trade-offs. Furthermore, although 
most GPs are paid by a combination of FFS and capitation, some are salaried. Being able to 
control for this would also have been preferable.  
 
7.2 Inference 
The main findings of this study, is that GP characteristics are highly relevant in explaining 
reservation. This is underlined by the results from the fixed effects models, where around 
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60% of the variation was explained by constant unobserved individual characteristics of the 
GPs. By comparison, Hellerstein (1998, p. 125) estimated that almost 30% of the unobserved 
variation in her data was due to physician characteristics. A proportion of the variation in our 
data can be attributed to constant variables that cannot be included in fixed effects models 
(e.g. age, sex, specialist), but there are clearly many other unknown factors. Preferences are 
such unknown factors that are likely to have a large effect. With reference to the theoretical 
model; altruism, valuation of societal costs and personal income is likely to vary widely 
between individuals and translate into different rates of reservation.   
 
Personal characteristics of the GP 
Age had strong explanatory power across the different models, with highly significant 
coefficients. This supports previous findings by others, including Shrank et al (2011) & 
Dalen et al (2011), that older doctors use reservation more often. Stronger habits and lower 
confidence in the generic equivalent are some of the more immediate possible explanations, 
in addition to older patient populations. Having experienced more reforms and institutional 
arrangements, willingness to comply with guidelines can also be weakened with age. 
Keeping in mind that generic substitution was introduced in 2001, this might provide some 
understanding. Accordingly, relatively more weight will be given to the personal assessments 
of the GP, and in turn weaken preferences towards those of the state – like societal costs. A 
study by Van Leeuwen et al (1995) found that older doctors were less updated on 
professional knowledge than their peers. If dissemination of information about generics is 
slower amongst older GPs, this might also explain some of the variation. Specialists on the 
other hand, are likely to follow new medical developments more closely. The findings in 
Table 7 where specialists have lower reservation within the oldest age group would support 
this hypothesis. A similar association was also found in the twopm for “new” ATCs, where 
the negative coefficient might reflect that specialists are more aware of new generics entering 
the market. In turn, this awareness might translate into lower reservation levels. The 
increased confidence can also reduce patients’ utility from being prescribed the brand 
version.   
 
From a policy perspective, higher reservation among older GPs is not necessarily a problem 
in the long run. If one gives more weight to the hypothesis of schooling and attitudes towards 
generics, the results give reason to believe that the overall level of reservation is transitory. 
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Holding the patient population constant, todays younger GPs might have a different attitude 
towards generics in the late of their careers, compared to what is the case today. 
 
Reservation does not differ noticeably whether the GP is a man or a woman. However, 
reservation in our model can be motivated from a wide range of factors, including income 
and altruism. Whether or not males or females have different preferences relating to these 
factors would be an interesting topic for further research. In terms of patient population, 
Lurås (2004) has shown that patients have a tendency to choose GPs that have the same sex 
as them. Without drawing any conclusions, an insignificant effect of being a male GP, might 
therefore also reflect that male and female patients have similar attitudes towards generics.   
 
There are many ways of defining habit, and its effect on prescription behaviour. Dalen et al 
(2011) looked at GP-characteristics like age and sex, Coscelli (2000) at prescribing 
behaviour, and Hellerstein (1998) at spill-over effects from one patient group to another. 
Irrespective of how habits are defined, the above studies suggest that habits are indeed sticky 
and that they translate into fairly strong preferences in prescription decisions. As defined in 
our model, frequency of prescription can also be thought of a proxy for confidence in generic 
equivalence. The predictions in our models that are of most relevance in studying habit 
formation/confidence show desirable results: reservation decreases with increased 
prescriptions of drugs within that indication/ATC. We would be inclined to interpret this 
effect more as a sign of increased confidence rather than habit formation (cf. Section 3.2). In 
other words, a GP who prescribes a drug often is more likely to have prescribed the drug to a 
wide range of patients. Any uncertainty of the effect of generics is therefore believed to 
diminish, and the GP will be less likely to give in to patient pressure. Interestingly, this effect 
seems to be somewhat stronger for “new” ATCs than that of “old” ATCs. In the predictions 
of the twopms, the corresponding marginal effects are –0,0113 and -0,0080. This suggests 
that confidence plays a stronger part in newer generic markets where uncertainty is likely 
more widespread amongst GPs.  
 
Market conditions 
One of the main insights from this thesis is the effect of competition on reservation. All the 
models showed the same association: more competition increases reservation. This suggests 
that the gatekeeper function of physicians is weakened in markets with a high degree of 
competition. The main hypothesis is that GPs attempt to retain patients in their practice in 
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order not to lose income. The stronger effect of competition in new generic markets, suggests 
that patients are more susceptible to switching GPs in their first encounter with generic 
substitution. Equivalently, the GPs might fear that this is the case, and more easily give in to 
perceived patient pressure. With reference to the discussion on confidence and dissemination 
of information, this effect might come from the increased uncertainty. With respect to our 
theoretical model in Section 3.1; increased competition makes the patients’ benefit more 
important for the GP from an income perspective, and especially so for the case of new 
generics. 
 
Earlier literature has found that competition does have explanatory power in various parts of 
the GP-practice ( (Sagdahl, 2010), (Lurås, 2004) (Godager, Iversen, & Ma, 2015) (Iversen & 
Lurås, 2011)). However, as is clear when reading previous research, there is no definite way 
of defining competition among GPs. Before deciding on the variable comp_municipality 
many others were considered, including patient shortage, herfindahl index, proportion of a 
single list filled, GP-spots per capita etc. In broad, these measures of competition did not 
have as significant and strong effects as comp_municipality60. They did however point in the 
same direction; namely that competition increases reservation. The herfindahl index however 
gave positive results, indicating that a decrease in competition (or increase in market power) 
leads to more reservation; contrary to what we would expect. This might however be the 
result of the index being based on municipality measures. Larger municipalities will in reality 
be represented by several smaller markets. The index might therefore act more as a proxy for 
population size than for competition61. Together this shows how analyses of competition are 
susceptible of the choice of variable, and accordingly to some extent weakens the predictions 
of our model. 
 
Some of the variation in reservation between the different years studied is not easily 
explained, but is likely affected by our assumptions of genuine generic competition and our 
choice of indications/ATCs. As was clear when making the sample from the raw data, there 
are many generics that enter and exit the market within fairly short time frames. This gives a 
60 See Appendix I for output from different measures of competition.  61 Centrality and herfindahl variable highly correlated (0,4022) 
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degree of disturbance with respect to lag in time from prescribing to dispensing the drug. 
Drug availability in pharmacies is also an issue.  
 
NOMA has hypothesized that the introduction of an e-prescription module within GP 
computer systems may have affected overall reservation levels. A transition from manual to 
electronic prescriptions can have led to uncertainty among GPs in stating non-reservation and 
reservation correctly. In the recent report by HELFO (2015a) where reservation rates of 20 
GPs were controlled, this was listed as one of the explanations for increased reservation. 
Amongst others, the GPs mentioned experiences with systems where reservation was listed as 
the default option. However, as we see in Table 14 e-prescription increases in our studied 
period.  
Table 14: Trend in use of e-prescription 
Percentage of prescriptions made with e-prescription 
2011 2012 2013 2014 
2.3 % 23.1 % 60.7 % 62.1 % 
 
In the most representative samples for the case of e-prescription, “overall” and “old” ATCs; 
the models show decreasing reservation rates, opposite of what we would expect given the 
hypothesis. One might be able to find different results in looking at all drugs on the market, 
but we cannot find the same support in our data. 
  
When looking at “new” ATCs, the effect of the year dummies is reversed, with consistently 
higher reservation levels for 2012-14 than the baseline. Since the drugs included in “new” 
ATCs enter into generic competition at different points in time, the lack of a clear trend is 
unsurprising. In the descriptive statistics, however, the general picture is that GP-reservation 
increases over time, and patient reservation decreases. This is supported by the fixed effects 
model, where decreased patient reservation leads to increased GP reservation for “new” 
ATCs. One might expect the opposite effect: that GPs are reluctant to use a new generic 
when having prescribed the brand-version for years.  
 
Keeping in mind that brand-name prescriptions can still be substituted as long as a 
reservation is not made, might give some explanation. In other words, the GP does not know 
that there is a generic competitor available when writing the prescription. On the basis of 
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discussions with NOMA, there is reason to believe that patients might be informed about 
generic substitution before the prescriber. If uninformed about the introduction of generic 
competition for a prescribed drug, a patient might be surprised with substitution in the 
pharmacy and choose to make a reservation. In the subsequent GP-visit, the patient confronts 
his GP with this information, and asks the GP for a reservation note to avoid the added cost 
himself. In time, the GP will gather more information about the generic’s market entry, and 
become more confident about denying new patients the branded version. Doctor reservation 
will thereafter stabilize and find an equilibrium, which will decrease over time. This 
hypothesis is supported by the reservation trend of the other indications, which are either 
fairly stable or decreasing. This might suggest that the gatekeeper role of GPs is weakened in 
initial aftermath of generic market entry. Dalen et al (2011) studied the effect of new generic 
markets, and found that drugs that had recently gone off patent had higher rates of 
reservation. Since they looked at the aggregate number of reservation, and not the trend, their 
findings does not conflict with ours.  
 
The models results in “overall” suggest that the indication in question explains much of the 
variation in reservation. The differences in reservation rates between indications might 
indicate that there are more medically justifiable reasons to use reservations for some 
indications than others. After discussions with NOMA, another possible explanation of 
differences might relate to a “placebo effect”; taking what the patient perceives to be an 
inferior medicine (i.e. generic), might be of less concern if the effect of the drug is not 
observable to the patient. The argument goes that if the effect of the drug is hidden to the 
patient (e.g. lower cholesterol level), the patient will, to a lower degree, have any opinion of 
the effect. Contrary, the symptoms of stomach ulcer and depression drugs are to a larger 
extent felt by the patient. The hypothesis was supported by the findings of Stoinska-
Schneider (2011). In our results the coefficient of ulcer has a negative sign, opposite of what 
was found by Stoinska-Schneider (2011). Accordingly, we cannot provide any support to the 
hypothesis. A possible explanation to the opposite sign of the ulcer coefficient is the 
inclusion of more drugs within the different indications. Additionally, it might be the case 
that acceptance for generic versions within the ulcer indication has matured among both 
patients and GPs.     
 
As discussed in the literature review, the effects of price differences on reservation can work 
both ways. The mixed predictions our models provide suggest that price differences do not 
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matter at the aggregate level. With reference to our theoretical model, it might be the case 
that preferences towards the patients’ benefit and that of limiting societal expenses simply 
offset each other. Then again, the results can also mean that GPs simply don’t care at all.  
 
Lastly, we cannot find support for an unambiguous association between centrality of a 
municipality and the corresponding level of reservation. Stoinska-Schneider (2011) used 
centrality as a proxy for looking at the effect of marketing (in addition to competition). She 
found that central areas indeed had higher rates of reservation. Since both extremes of the 
centrality scale showed persistently higher rates of reservation in our results, the same 
conclusion could not be drawn. Possibly, less conclusive results might be due to the inclusion 
of the competition variable, although this was not the case when first including the dummy.  
 
Because not all drugs are marketed as heavily as others, it would be interesting to dig deeper 
into a few chosen active ingredients. To skim the surface of the hypothesis, a look at 
Omeprazole gave some insight. In looking at Table 16, it has a consistently higher 
reservation rates than the indications as a whole, with a marked decrease over less central 
areas (2 and 3).  
Table 15: Reservation by centrality and indication 
Centrality Ulcer Cholesterol Depression Omeprazole Total 
0 .053769 .031998 .050120 .222904 .054190 
1 .037312 .031969 .047306 .184265 .049634 
2 .031781 .020595 .03711 .136872 .038372 
3 .040056 .029229 .050010 .146012 .051363 
Total .047844 .031066 .048804 .205776 .052063 
 
It has been suggested that the high reservation rates of this drug might be due to an effective 
marketing campaign towards GPs by pharma-reps. This gives some support to the hypothesis 
of marketing and its effect on GP preferences in prescription behaviour that is worth 
exploring further. 
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8 Conclusion 
The compiled findings in this study suggest that GP-characteristics and market conditions are 
highly relevant for explaining different rates of reservation. In addition to verifying previous 
results from other studies, this thesis has given new insights on the effect of increased 
confidence. Furthermore, market conditions in the form of competition and maturity of 
generic markets proved important in explaining different reservation rates. Although not 
explicitly measured, the factors studied give strong reasons to believe that preferences are 
important, and that they are not isolated from context.  
 
In the grand of things, however, what motivates a GP in his choice of using a reservation note 
might not matter that much as long as the overall reservation rate is unproblematic. This leads 
us to the overarching question of what rate of reservation is problematic? If there is such a 
thing as a “correct” rate of reservation, the costs of inducing GPs to make correct reservation 
choices might outweigh the corresponding benefits.  
 
Acknowledging the trouble of stating a ”correct” rate of reservation, it is hard to say whether 
or not it is problematic. The most theoretically pleasing way to define a problematic rate of 
reservation is large (positive) deviations from the mean. A GP with 20-percentage points 
higher reservation rate than his peers is at least questionable. This was also made clear by the 
recent report of HELFO (2015a) that deemed reservation practices of 20 GPs as both highly 
excessive and costly.  
 
Reducing information imperfections in the form of increasing knowledge about generic 
market entry and generic equivalence might reduce the amount of outliers. Compiling the 
findings, however, reservation levels among the large majority of GPs are unproblematic. 
Nevertheless, the findings do show that in practicing their profession, GPs are far from 
isolated from personal convictions and market forces.    
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Appendix A: ATC-explanation 
A thorough explanation of the ATC classification system is given below, as described in its 
entirety by the WHO Collaborating Centre for Drug Statistics Methodology62: 
 
“In the Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) classification system, the active substances 
are divided into different groups according to the organ or system on which they act and 
their therapeutic, pharmacological and chemical properties. 
 
Drugs are classified in groups at five different levels. The drugs are divided into fourteen 
main groups (1st level), with pharmacological/therapeutic subgroups (2nd level). The 3rd 
and 4th levels are chemical/pharmacological/therapeutic subgroups and the 5th level is the 
chemical substance. The 2nd, 3rd and 4th levels are often used to identify pharmacological 
subgroups when that is considered more appropriate than therapeutic or chemical 
subgroups. The complete classification of metformin illustrates the structure of the code:  
 
A  Alimentary tract and metabolism  
(1st level, anatomical main group) 
A10  Drugs used in diabetes  
(2nd level, therapeutic subgroup) 
A10B  Blood glucose lowering drugs, excl. insulins  
(3rd level, pharmacological subgroup) 
A10BA  Biguanides  
(4th level, chemical subgroup) 
A10BA02  metformin  
(5th level, chemical substance) 
 
Thus, in the ATC system all plain metformin preparations are given the code A10BA02.” 
 
 
62 http://www.whocc.no/filearchive/publications/1_2013guidelines.pdf 
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Appendix B: Derivation of equations and proof 
 
Increase in altruism: 
𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋∗
𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼
= 𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵′′(𝑋𝑋) 𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋
𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼
+𝐵𝐵′(𝑋𝑋) + 𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐺′′(𝑋𝑋)𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋
𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼
− 𝑘𝑘𝑆𝑆′′(𝑋𝑋)𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋
𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼
= 0 
 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
= − 𝐵𝐵′(𝜕𝜕)(𝜕𝜕𝐵𝐵′′ (𝜕𝜕)+𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐺′′(𝜕𝜕)−𝑘𝑘𝑆𝑆′′(𝜕𝜕)) 
𝛼𝛼, 𝑙𝑙, 𝑘𝑘 > 0 
𝐵𝐵′′(𝑋𝑋)<0 , 𝐺𝐺′′(𝑋𝑋)<0, 𝑆𝑆′′(𝑋𝑋)>0 
 (𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵′′(𝑋𝑋) + 𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐺′′(𝑋𝑋) − 𝑘𝑘𝑆𝑆′′(𝑋𝑋)) < 0 
𝐵𝐵′(𝑋𝑋) > 0 
 − 𝐵𝐵′(𝜕𝜕)(𝜕𝜕𝐵𝐵′′ (𝜕𝜕)+𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐺′′(𝜕𝜕)−𝑘𝑘𝑆𝑆′′(𝜕𝜕)) >0 
 𝝏𝝏𝑿𝑿
𝝏𝝏𝜶𝜶
> 𝟎𝟎 
Increased weighting 
of income: 
 
𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋∗
𝜕𝜕𝑙𝑙
= 𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵′′(𝑋𝑋)𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋
𝜕𝜕𝑙𝑙
+ 𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐺′′(𝑋𝑋)𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋
𝜕𝜕𝑙𝑙
+ 𝐺𝐺′(𝑋𝑋) −𝑘𝑘𝑆𝑆′′(𝑋𝑋)𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋
𝜕𝜕𝑙𝑙
= 0 
 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑙𝑙
= − 𝐺𝐺′(𝜕𝜕)(𝜕𝜕𝐵𝐵′′ (𝜕𝜕)+𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐺′′(𝜕𝜕)−𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆′′(𝜕𝜕)) 
𝛼𝛼, 𝑙𝑙, 𝑘𝑘 > 0 
𝐵𝐵′′(𝑋𝑋)<0 , 𝐺𝐺′′(𝑋𝑋)<0, 𝑆𝑆′′(𝑋𝑋)>0 
 (𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵′′(𝑋𝑋) + 𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐺′′(𝑋𝑋) − 𝑘𝑘𝑆𝑆′′(𝑋𝑋)) < 0 
𝐺𝐺′(𝑋𝑋) > 
 − 𝐺𝐺′(𝜕𝜕)(𝜕𝜕𝐵𝐵′′ (𝜕𝜕)+𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐺′′(𝜕𝜕)−𝑘𝑘𝑆𝑆′′(𝜕𝜕)) >0 
 𝝏𝝏𝑿𝑿
𝝏𝝏𝒍𝒍
> 𝟎𝟎 
Increased weighting 
of societal expenses: 
 
𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋∗
𝜕𝜕𝑙𝑙
= 𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵′′(𝑋𝑋)𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋
𝜕𝜕𝑙𝑙
+ 𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐺′′(𝑋𝑋)𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋
𝜕𝜕𝑙𝑙
+ 𝐺𝐺′(𝑋𝑋) −𝑘𝑘𝑆𝑆′′(𝑋𝑋)𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋
𝜕𝜕𝑙𝑙
= 0 
 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
∗
𝜕𝜕𝑘𝑘
= 𝑆𝑆′(𝜕𝜕)(𝜕𝜕𝐵𝐵′′(𝜕𝜕)+𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐺′′(𝜕𝜕)−𝑘𝑘𝑆𝑆′′(𝜕𝜕)) 
𝛼𝛼, 𝑙𝑙, 𝑘𝑘 >0 
𝐵𝐵′′(𝑋𝑋)<0 , 𝐺𝐺′′(𝑋𝑋)<0, 𝑆𝑆′′(𝑋𝑋)>0 
 (𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵′′(𝑋𝑋) + 𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐺′′(𝑋𝑋) − 𝑘𝑘𝑆𝑆′′(𝑋𝑋)) < 0 
𝑆𝑆′(𝑋𝑋) > 0 
 𝑆𝑆′(𝜕𝜕)(𝜕𝜕𝐵𝐵′′(𝜕𝜕)+𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐺′′(𝜕𝜕)−𝑘𝑘𝑆𝑆′′ (𝜕𝜕)) < 0 
 𝝏𝝏𝑿𝑿
𝝏𝝏𝒌𝒌
< 𝟎𝟎                
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Appendix C: Sample selection and merging 
In the original dataset from the HELFO registry each observation constituted a unique 
prescription63 made by a single GP, with the variable doctor_reservation equal to “1” if a 
reservation had been made. Depending on the statistical method used, the dates of 
prescriptions were aggregated yearly for every GP over the years the dataset covered (2011-
2014). The year 2014 contained notably fewer observations than for the other years. This is 
likely due to the extraction of raw data: observations for each year were provided in separate 
files, and each of them contained a certain amount of observations from the preceding year. 
Since the subsequent year of 2014, 2015, was not provided, 2014 had fewer observations. 
According to the Directorate of Health, this was due to some drugs being dispensed from the 
pharmacy in the year after they were prescribed. The corresponding bias in reservation levels 
was considered to be limited at most.   
 
Extraction of sample 
The thesis studies possible physicians have different rates of reservation against generic 
substitution, with doctor reservations as the dependant variable. For this variable to be 
relevant, it had to be based on a sample of prescriptions where the GP had the option to make 
a generic reservation. Not all drugs with an off patent active ingredient are put on the 
substitution list, and not all drugs that are on the substitution list have generic competitors. 
The reason for this can be that the volume sold of a drug is too low for generic manufacturers 
to be interested in entering the market. It might also be the case that the brand-company has 
lowered its price to a level where generics are not in a position to compete. It was therefore 
decided to only include drugs where there was genuine generic competition at the time of 
prescription. Genuine generic competition is here defined as a situation where a given drug 
package was on the substitution list at the time of prescription, and where there were actual 
sales of that drug. We do however recognize that even in cases where there are no generic 
sales, the fact that generics are on the substitution list might drive down prices of brand 
drugs. In order to account for our assumptions, the NOMA drug-database Athene and the 
independent database of drug statistics Farmastat were consulted.  
 
63 All prescriptions were for partially refundable drugs (blåresept) 
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Athene has information on when a particular drug was placed on NOMAs substitution list. 
All prescriptions that were made before a certain drug was put on this list were eliminated 
from the sample. This can be the case for directly imported brand drugs that are substitutable 
with a parallel imported64 brand drug.  
 
Farmastat retrieves information from drug sales and –volume. Data on all generic drugs 
within the ATC-groups used in the analysis were checked. If there were no sales in a 
particular month, there can neither have been any genuine generic competition. For a few 
drugs, sales were fairly volatile; in that there might have been sales for the entire data-period, 
except for a few months within this time frame. This posed some methodological challenges 
in terms of what sample to use, especially since the actual sale of a drug can take place well 
after the prescription was made.  
 
A certain amount of the drugs in the sample was not registered on the substitution list but had 
still recorded sales in farmastat. This was thoroughly investigated for every drug where this 
was the case. Some drugs had changed id-number during the time-period of the dataset, and 
was accordingly still included in the sample. Others were imported drugs for purposes of 
filling a temporary shortage of drugs in pharmacies that were on the substitution list. This can 
occur on rare occasions as wholesalers run out of drugs for a certain active ingredient. Since 
the demand is fairly constant, drugs with the same active ingredients that are not on the 
substitution list can fill this void. Consequently, neither doctor- nor patient reservations can 
occur for these cases. Therefore all drugs for which this was the case, was eliminated from 
the sample. This also explains why some years for some active ingredients in the final sample 
had fewer prescriptions than others65. 
 
Prescriptions for chronic conditions last for up to one year, but patients can only collect a 
stock of three months worth of medicines every time. This means that the actual sales of a 
medicine can take place long after the prescription was made – as was the case for the earlier 
mentioned data on 2014. Since no good data were available on average time passed before a 
prescription is expedited in a pharmacy, it is hard to make any assumptions about this either. 
With this in mind we decided, in consultation with NOMA, to include prescriptions from the 
64 As defined by NOMA; parallell imported drugs are brand drugs imported from other 
eruopean countries where the prices are lower than in Norway: http://bit.ly/1SC6per  
65 See Table 6 in the descriptive statistics (6.1) for overview.   
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first month of registered sales up until the last month of sales. Some drugs had minor gaps 
where there were no sales. In order to not make the extraction too complex and time 
consuming, these minor gaps were also included66.  
 
Furthermore, drugs that had no sales neither at the start nor at the end of the analysed period 
were eliminated67. The drugs for which this was the case, had limited sales volume and 
removing them from the sample was therefore believed to cause negligible changes to the 
results. Lastly, all drugs that were parallel imports were removed. Parallel imported drugs are 
by and large brand drugs. In the few cases that they are generics, they are still not classified 
accordingly by NOMA. Measuring reservation for these drugs is therefore irrelevant. For a 
full list of what drugs were included, and for what time-periods are provided in the end of 
this appendix.  
 
Since the above assumptions leave a degree of uncertainty68, including our definition of 
genuine generic competition, it was decided to make a separate extraction of data where only 
packages that had sales the entire period were included. This limited sample does not reflect 
the true market for generics, but it evades the problem of gaps and how to account for drugs 
being dispensed well after the prescription was made. The reservation rates and results that 
are based on this sample are included in the Appendix F.   
 
After extracting the relevant sample, the data from the HELFO registry were first merged 
with the two original dataset from the GP registry by health personnel number (hpr_nr) and 
year, and thereafter the publically available GP registry on the basis of municipality 
(municipality_code) and year. 
 
 
 
After inspecting the raw data from the GP registry, a certain amount of observations had to be 
dropped: - Observations for 16 doctors that were registered with an age above 1000 years  
66 The drugs for which this was the case had a fewer observations, and the decision of 
inclusion or not was therefore expected to cause little distortion in any case. 
67 A few drugs with a high prescription rate (e.g. > 1000 per month) were included, as 
exclusion of these seemed to cause some bias  
68 The assumptions are not expected to be affect the independent variables notably. This is 
verified when looking at the results from the limited sample in Appendix G.  
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- Observations for 146 doctors that had GP-lists in two or more counties  - All observations where the patient list was shared between two or more GPs (approx. 
175 GPs)  - 115 prescriptions that were not registered with a health personnel (hpr) number.  
 
Furthermore, upon merging these datasets, not all observations were matched – e.g. some 
physicians that had made a prescription were not registered in the GP registry.  - After extracting atc’s from raw data of the HELFO registry, the number of 
observations (prescriptions) were 11 933 033 (928 887 were dropped due to our 
assumptions of generic competition). - After merging with data from the GP registry, 3 313 537 observations from the 
HELFO registry, and 79 from the GP registry were unmatched. These observations 
were deleted, and we were left with 8 603 499 observations. - When merging with the publically available data from the GP registry, 8 948 in old 
dataset and 315 from the GP registry were unmatched. This left us with 8 594 551 
observations. - Lastly, upon inspecting the ATCs closely, 30 415 observations for ATC 13 had to be 
deleted. These were reservations that occurred before March 2012, the time generic 
competition started for this ATC. The final dataset consisted therefore of 8 564 136 
observations  
 
From this final dataset, separate extracts were made and aggregated depending on the 
indications/ATCs studied and model applied. For a distribution of the variables depending on 
the different with the different extracts and aggregations, see Appendix D. 
 
The following table list gives an overview of the packages that were included in the main 
sample. For the limited sample, only the packages marked “whole period” were included.  
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 ATC Package 
number 
Package name Time period 
included in 
sample 
Ranitidine 
A02BA02 
 
1349 RANITIDIN RATIO TAB 150MG 30ENPAC Whole period 
1371 RANITIDIN RATIO TAB 150MG 60ENPAC Whole period 
1380 RANITIDIN RATIO TAB 150MG 90ENPAC Whole period 
1402 RANITIDIN RATIO TAB 300MG 30ENPAC Whole period 
1413 RANITIDIN RATIO TAB 300MG 90ENPAC Whole period 
5225 ZANTAC BRUSETA 300MG 15ENPAC  Whole period 
37549 ZANTAC TAB 150MG 90ENPAC  Whole period 
37564 ZANTAC TAB 300MG 90ENPAC  Whole period 
437657 ZANTAC TAB 150MG 50ENDOS  Whole period 
495259 ZANTAC BRUSETA 150MG 30STK  Whole period 
OMEPRAZOLE 
A02BC01 
 
 
7635 OMEPRAZOL RATIOPHARM ENTKAPS 20MG 28STK Jan-Apr 2011 
7644 OMEPRAZOL RATIOPHARM ENTKAPS 20MG 56STK Jan 2011 - Apr 2012 
7655 OMEPRAZOL RATIOPHARM ENTKAPS 20MG 100STK Jan-Feb 2011 
17982 OMEPRAZOL BMM PHARMA ENTTAB 20MG Jan-Mar 2011 
18018 OMEPRAZOL BMM PHARMA ENTTAB 10MG Jan-Apr 2011 
24882 OMEPRAZOL BMM PHARMA ENTTAB 10MG January 2011 
24896 OMEPRAZOL BMM PHARMA ENTTAB 20MG Jan-Mar 2011 
32391 LOSEC MUPS ENTTAB 10MG 2X50STK Whole period 
33480 LOSEC MUPS ENTTAB 20MG 56STK Whole period 
33761 LOSEC MUPS ENTTAB 20MG 2X50STK Whole period 
33837 LOSEC MUPS ENTTAB 20MG 28STK Whole period 
43856 OMEPRAZOL PENSA ENTKAPS 20MG 2X50ENPAC From September 2012 
45644 OMEPRAZOL BLUEFISH ENTKAPS 20MG 28ENPAC From April 2014 
57775 OMEPRAZOLE TEVA ENTKAPS 20MG 28STK From June 2014 
88679 OMEPRAZOL PENSA ENTKAPS 10MG 2X50ENPAC From September 2012 
116039 OMEPRAZOL BLUEFISH ENTKAPS 20MG 14KAPS Jan 2011 - Feb 2014 
116050 OMEPRAZOL BLUEFISH ENTKAPS 10MG 100KAPS Jan 2011 - Apr 2014 
116062 OMEPRAZOL BLUEFISH ENTKAPS 20MG 28KAPS Jan 2011 - Feb 2014 
116073 OMEPRAZOL BLUEFISH ENTKAPS 20MG 56KAPS Jan 2011 - Feb 2014 
116084 OMEPRAZOL BLUEFISH ENTKAPS 20MG 100KAPS Jan 2011 - Aug 2014 
412873 OMEPRAZOL PENSA ENTKAPS 20MG 14ENPAC From September 2012 
415860 OMEPRAZOL BLUEFISH ENTKAPS 10MG 100ENPAC From April 2014 
438191 OMEPRAZOL BLUEFISH ENTKAPS 20MG 100ENPAC From March 2014 
515290 OMEPRAZOLE TEVA ENTKAPS 20MG 2X28STK From June 2014 
534670 OMEPRAZOL BLUEFISH ENTKAPS 20MG 56ENPAC From April 2014 
537275 OMEPRAZOL PENSA ENTKAPS 20MG 56ENPAC From August 2012 
548007 OMEPRAZOLE TEVA ENTKAPS 20MG 14STK From June 2014 
555502 OMEPRAZOLE TEVA ENTKAPS 20MG 2X50STK From June 2014 
592605 OMEPRAZOLE TEVA ENTKAPS 10MG 2X50STK From June 2014 
593173 OMEPRAZOL PENSA ENTKAPS 20MG 28ENPAC From September 2012 
PANTOPRAZOLE 
A02BC02 
1411 SOMAC ENTTAB 40MG 14ENPAC  Whole period 
4801 SOMAC ENTTAB 40MG 28ENPAC  Whole period 
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 5209 SOMAC ENTTAB 40MG 56ENPAC  Whole period 
16851 SOMAC INJ SUB 40MG 5HGL Whole period 
70657 PANTOPRAZOL SANDOZ INJ SUB 40MG From March 2013 
88215 SOMAC ENTTAB 20MG 100ENDOS  Whole period 
108969 SOMAC ENTTAB 40MG 100ENDOS  Whole period 
131319 PANTOPRAZOL ACTAVIS ENTTAB 20MG 100ENPAC Whole period 
131374 PANTOPRAZOL ACTAVIS ENTTAB 40MG 100ENPAC Whole period 
545467 SOMAC ENTTAB 20MG 14ENPAC  Whole period 
545673 SOMAC ENTTAB 20MG 56ENPAC  Whole period 
LANSOPRAZOLE  
A02BC03 
 
 
22747 LANSOPRAZOL RATIOPHA ENTKAPS 15MG 56STK Whole period 
22785 LANSOPRAZOL RATIOPHA ENTKAPS 30MG 28STK Whole period 
22796 LANSOPRAZOL RATIOPHA ENTKAPS 30MG 56STK Whole period 
22807 LANSOPRAZOL RATIOPHA ENTKAPS 30MG 100STK Whole period 
22818 LANSOPRAZOL RATIOPHA ENTKAPS 15MG 14STK Whole period 
22840 
LANSOPRAZOL RATIOPHA ENTKAPS 15MG 
2X50STK Whole period 
22846 LANSOPRAZOL RATIOPHA ENTKAPS 30MG 14STK Whole period 
23040 LANSOPRAZOL RATIOPHA ENTKAPS 15MG 28STK Whole period 
23949 LANSOPRAZOL KRKA ENTKAPS 15MG 98STK From June 2014  
23993 LANSOPRAZOL KRKA ENTKAPS 30MG 98STK From June 2014  
164573 LANSOPRAZOL KRKA ENTKAPS 30MG 14ENPAC From June 2014  
164584 LANSOPRAZOL KRKA ENTKAPS 30MG 28ENPAC From June 2014  
164595 LANSOPRAZOL KRKA ENTKAPS 30MG 56ENPAC From June 2014  
164606 LANSOPRAZOL KRKA ENTKAPS 15MG 14ENPAC From June 2014  
164617 LANSOPRAZOL KRKA ENTKAPS 15MG 28ENPAC From June 2014  
164628 LANSOPRAZOL KRKA ENTKAPS 15MG 56ENPAC From June 2014  
AMLODIPINE 
  
C08CA01 
 
17196 AMLODIPIN ACTAVIS TAB 5MG 30ENPAC Whole period 
17218 AMLODIPIN ACTAVIS TAB 10MG 100ENPAC Whole period 
17248 AMLODIPIN ACTAVIS TAB 5MG 100ENPAC Whole period 
22269 NORVASC TAB 5MG 30ENPAC  Whole period 
22293 NORVASC TAB 5MG 100ENPAC  Whole period 
22368 NORVASC TAB 10MG 100ENPAC  Whole period 
89152 AMLODIPIN SANDOZ TAB 10MG 100STK From May 2012 
91765 AMLODIPIN SANDOZ TAB 10MG 30ENPAC From May 2012 
94897 AMLODIPIN BMM PHARMA TAB 5MG Jan-Mar 2011 
101327 AMLODIPIN SANDOZ TAB 5MG 30ENPAC From May 2012 
448413 AMLODIPIN SANDOZ TAB 5MG 100STK From May 2012 
FELODIPINE 
C08CA02 
 
10936 FELODIPIN RATIOPHARM DEPOTTA 5MG 30ENPAC Whole period 
10947 FELODIPIN RATIOPHARM DEPOTTA 5MG 100ENDOS Whole period 
10980 
FELODIPIN RATIOPHARM DEPOTTA 10MG 
100ENDOS Whole period 
11897 FELODIPIN HEXAL DEPOTTA 5MG 30ENPAC Whole period 
12109 FELODIPIN HEXAL DEPOTTA 5MG 100ENPAC Whole period 
12123 FELODIPIN HEXAL DEPOTTA 10MG 30ENPAC Whole period 
12131 FELODIPIN HEXAL DEPOTTA 10MG 100ENPAC Whole period 
30309 FELODIPIN HEXAL DEPOTTA 2.5MG 100ENPAC Whole period 
165431 PLENDIL DEPOTTA 2.5MG 98ENPAC  Jan 2011 - Oct 2012 
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165449 PLENDIL DEPOTTA 10MG 98ENPAC  Whole period 
165548 PLENDIL DEPOTTA 5MG 98ENPAC  Whole period 
 
LERCANIDIPINE  
C08CA13 
 
 
13233 ZANIDIP TAB 20MG 98ENPAC  Whole period 
65934 LERKANIDIPIN ACTAVIS TAB 10MG 28ENPAC Whole period 
65945 LERKANIDIPIN ACTAVIS TAB 10MG 98ENPAC Whole period 
65956 LERKANIDIPIN ACTAVIS TAB 20MG 98ENPAC Whole period 
74575 ZANIDIP TAB 10MG 28ENPAC  Whole period 
92817 ZANIDIP TAB 10MG 98ENPAC  Whole period 
SIMVASTATIN 
C10AA01 
 
10908 SIMVASTATIN RATIOPHA TAB 10MG 28ENPAC Jan 2011 - Jan 2013 
10940 SIMVASTATIN RATIOPHA TAB 10MG 98ENPAC Jan-Jul 2011 
10955 SIMVASTATIN RATIOPHA TAB 20MG 28ENPAC Jan-May 2011 
10966 SIMVASTATIN RATIOPHA TAB 20MG 98ENPAC Jan-May 2011 
10999 SIMVASTATIN RATIOPHA TAB 40MG 98ENPAC Jan-Jun 2011 
20561 SIMVASTATIN HEXAL TAB 80MG 100ENPAC From April 2014 
21133 SIMVASTATIN ACTAVIS TAB 40MG 98ENPAC Jan-May 2011 
21156 SIMVASTATIN ACTAVIS TAB 20MG 98ENPAC Jan-Feb 2011 
21159 SIMVASTATIN ACTAVIS TAB 10MG 98ENPAC Jan-Feb 2011 
21228 SIMVASTATIN ACTAVIS TAB 10MG 28ENPAC Jan-Feb 2011 
23685 SIMVASTATIN KRKA TAB 20MG 100ENDOS Whole period 
23703 SIMVASTATIN KRKA TAB 40MG 100ENDOS Whole period 
38494 SIMVASTATIN BLUEFISH TAB 40MG 100ENPAC From October 2013 
56179 SIMVASTATIN PFIZER TAB 20MG 30ENPAC Jun 2011 - Jan 2014 
56190 SIMVASTATIN PFIZER TAB 20MG 100ENPAC Jun 2011 - Mar 2014 
56201 SIMVASTATIN PFIZER TAB 40MG 30ENPAC Jun 2011 - Mar 2014 
56212 SIMVASTATIN PFIZER TAB 40MG 100ENPAC Jun 2011 - Mar 2014 
58854 SIMVASTATIN AUROBIND TAB 10MG 30ENPAC Jan 2011 - Aug 2012 
58865 SIMVASTATIN AUROBIND TAB 10MG 100ENPAC Jan 2011 - Jul 2012 
58876 SIMVASTATIN AUROBIND TAB 20MG 30ENPAC Jan 2011 - Mar 2012 
58888 SIMVASTATIN AUROBIND TAB 20MG 100ENPAC Jan-Nov 2011 
58899 SIMVASTATIN AUROBIND TAB 40MG 30ENPAC Jan 2011 - Apr 2012 
58910 SIMVASTATIN AUROBIND TAB 40MG 100ENPAC Jan-Oct 2011 
58921 SIMVASTATIN AUROBIND TAB 80MG 100ENPAC Jan 2011 - Feb 2012 
96360 SIMVASTATIN SANDOZ TAB 10MG 30ENPAC From April 2014 
96369 SIMVASTATIN SANDOZ TAB 20MG 30ENPAC From April 2014 
96387 SIMVASTATIN SANDOZ TAB 20MG 100ENPAC From April 2014 
96397 SIMVASTATIN SANDOZ TAB 40MG 30ENPAC From April 2014 
96415 SIMVASTATIN SANDOZ TAB 40MG 100ENPAC From April 2014 
97864 SIMVASTATIN TEVA TAB 10MG 98ENPAC From October 2013 
103727 SIMVASTATIN TEVA TAB 20MG 98ENPAC From October 2013 
111651 SIMVASTATIN SANDOZ TAB 10MG 100STK From April 2014 
144242 SIMVASTATIN BLUEFISH TAB 80MG 100ENPAC Nov 2013 - Oct 2014 
162874 SIMVASTATIN BLUEFISH TAB 10MG 100ENPAC Mar 2011 - Oct 2014 
162885 SIMVASTATIN BLUEFISH TAB 20MG 100ENPAC Jan 2011 - May 2014 
162896 SIMVASTATIN BLUEFISH TAB 40MG 100ENPAC Jan 2011 - May 2014 
162907 SIMVASTATIN BLUEFISH TAB 80MG 100ENPAC Jan 2011 - Apr 2014 
382531 ZOCOR TAB 40MG 98ENPAC  Whole period 
431603 SIMVASTATIN TEVA TAB 80MG 98ENPAC From September 2013 
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454165 ZOCOR TAB 10MG 98ENPAC  Whole period 
454199 ZOCOR TAB 20MG 98ENPAC  Whole period 
468776 SIMVASTATIN TEVA TAB 40MG 98ENPAC From October 2013 
470065 SIMVASTATIN TEVA TAB 10MG 28ENPAC From October 2013 
483175 SIMVASTATIN TEVA TAB 40MG 28ENPAC From February 2014 
501109 SIMVASTATIN TEVA TAB 20MG 28ENPAC From October 2013 
513195 SIMVASTATIN BLUEFISH TAB 20MG 100ENPAC From December 2013 
517334 ZOCOR TAB 80MG 98ENPAC  Whole period 
529872 SIMVASTATIN PFIZER TAB 80MG 100ENPAC Jul 2011 - Mar 2014 
591457 SIMVASTATIN BLUEFISH TAB 20MG 30ENPAC Apr 2011 - Jul 2014 
593321 SIMVASTATIN PFIZER TAB 10MG 100ENPAC Jun 2011 - May 2014 
PRAVASTATIN 
C10AA03 
 
35133 PRAVASTATIN TEVA TAB 40MG 100ENPAC From April 2012 
35142 PRAVASTATIN TEVA TAB 20MG 30ENPAC From December 2011 
35151 PRAVASTATIN TEVA TAB 20MG 100ENPAC From November 2011 
76424 PRAVASTATIN TEVA TAB 20MG 30ENPAC Whole Period 
76433 PRAVASTATIN TEVA TAB 20MG 100ENPAC Jan 2011 - Feb 2012 
76442 PRAVASTATIN TEVA TAB 40MG 30ENPAC Whole period 
76451 PRAVASTATIN TEVA TAB 40MG 100ENPAC Jan 2011 - Dec 2012 
135408 PRAVASTATIN SANDOZ TAB 20MG 30ENPAC Whole period 
135419 PRAVASTATIN SANDOZ TAB 20MG 100ENPAC Whole period 
135441 PRAVASTATIN SANDOZ TAB 40MG 100ENPAC Whole period 
180646 PRAVACHOL TAB 20MG 98ENPAC  Whole period 
567719 PRAVACHOL TAB 40MG 98ENPAC  Whole period 
SUMATRIPTAN  
N02CC01 
 
 
 
15145 IMIGRAN RADIS TAB 50MG 6ENPAC Whole period 
15382 IMIGRAN RADIS TAB 100MG 18ENPAC Whole period 
15442 IMIGRAN RADIS TAB 100MG 6ENPAC Whole period 
15443 IMIGRAN RADIS TAB 50MG 12ENPAC Whole period 
63339 IMIGRAN TAB 100MG 6ENPAC  Whole period 
81015 SUMATRIPTAN RATIOPHA TAB 100MG 6ENPAC Jan-Feb 2011 
81033 SUMATRIPTAN RATIOPHA TAB 100MG 18ENPAC Jan-Feb 2011 
85466 SUMATRIPTAN SUN INJ 12MG/ML 2X0.5MLPEN From May 2013 
92096 SUMATRIPTAN TEVA TAB 100MG 6ENPAC Whole period 
92105 SUMATRIPTAN TEVA TAB 50MG 6ENPAC Whole period 
93260 IMIGRAN INJ 12MG 2X0.5ML  Whole period 
95470 SUMATRIPTAN TEVA TAB 50MG 12ENPAC Whole period 
95507 SUMATRIPTAN TEVA TAB 100MG 18ENPAC Whole period 
122574 SUMATRIPTAN BLUEFISH TAB 100MG 6ENPAC From March 2014 
131563 SUMATRIPTAN BLUEFISH TAB 50MG 6ENPAC From April 2014 
172675 SUMATRIPTAN SUN INJ 12MG/ML 6X0.5MLPEN From May 2013 
415422 IMIGRAN NESESPR 20MG/DOS 18DOSER  Jan 2011 - Feb 2014 
429506 IMIGRAN SUPP 25MG 6STK  Whole period 
441451 IMIGRAN NESESPR 20MG/DOS 6DOSER  Whole period 
451908 SUMATRIPTAN BLUEFISH TAB 100MG 18ENPAC From November 2014 
496122 SUMATRIPTAN BLUEFISH TAB 50MG 12ENPAC From March 2014 
524926 IMIGRAN INJ 12MG 6X0.5ML  Whole period 
574541 IMIGRAN TAB 50MG 6ENPAC  Whole period 
574582 IMIGRAN TAB 100MG 18ENPAC  Whole period 
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585232 IMIGRAN TAB 50MG 12ENPAC  Whole period 
ZOLMITRIPTAN  
N02CC03 
 
 
 
89497 ZOLMITRIPTAN ACTAVIS TAB 2.5MG 6ENPAC From March 2012 
89509 ZOLMITRIPTAN ACTAVIS TAB 5MG 6ENPAC From March 2012 
89520 ZOLMITRIPTAN ACTAVIS SMELTAB 2.5MG 6ENPAC From March 2012 
114615 ZOLMITRIPTAN SANDOZ SMELTAB 2.5MG 6ENPAC From March 2012 
184432 ZOMIG RAPIMELT SMELTAB 2.5MG 6ENPAC Jan 2011 - Aug 2014 
184839 ZOLMITRIPTAN ACTAVIS TAB 2.5MG 18ENPAC From March 2012 
403219 ZOLMITRIPTAN SANDOZ TAB 2.5MG 6ENPAC From March 2012 
404631 
ZOLMITRIPTAN ACTAVIS SMELTAB 2.5MG 
12ENPAC From March 2012 
435537 ZOMIG TAB 5MG 6ENPAC  Jan 2011 - Feb 2014 
435545 ZOMIG TAB 5MG 18ENPAC  Whole period 
435594 ZOMIG TAB 2.5MG 6ENPAC  Jan 2011 -Dec 2013 
435610 ZOMIG TAB 2.5MG 18ENPAC  Whole period 
458492 ZOLMITRIPTAN SANDOZ TAB 2.5MG 18ENPAC From March 2012 
477725 ZOLMITRIPTAN ACTAVIS TAB 5MG 18ENPAC From March 2012 
480274 ZOLMITRIPTAN SANDOZ TAB 5MG 18ENPAC From March 2012 
526597 ZOLMITRIPTAN SANDOZ TAB 5MG 6ENPAC From March 2012 
551408 ZOMIG RAPIMELT SMELTAB 2.5MG 12ENPAC Whole period 
564770 ZOLMITRIPTAN SANDOZ SMELTAB 2.5MG 12ENPAC From March 2012 
CITALOPRAM  
N06AB04 
 
 
 
9053 CITALOPRAM RATIOPHAR TAB 10MG 28ENPAC Jan - Aug 2011 
9296 CITALOPRAM RATIOPHAR TAB 20MG 28ENPAC Jan - Mar 2011 
9307 CITALOPRAM RATIOPHAR TAB 20MG 98ENPAC Jan - Aug 2011 
69188 CITALOPRAM TEVA TAB 10MG 100ENPAC Jan - Jun 2011 
69197 CITALOPRAM TEVA TAB 20MG 30ENPAC Jan 2011 - Apr 2013 
69206 CITALOPRAM TEVA TAB 20MG 100ENPAC Jan - Jun 2011 
69215 CITALOPRAM TEVA TAB 40MG 100ENPAC Jan - Nov 2011 
69224 CITALOPRAM TEVA TAB 10MG 100ENPAC From June 2011 
69233 CITALOPRAM TEVA TAB 20MG 30ENPAC From March 2013 
69242 CITALOPRAM TEVA TAB 20MG 100ENPAC From June 2011 
69251 CITALOPRAM TEVA TAB 40MG 100ENPAC From December 2011 
77078 CITALOPRAM TEVA TAB 10MG 30ENPAC Whole period 
108864 CIPRAMIL TAB 20MG 56ENDOS  Jan 2011 - May 2014 
159194 CIPRAMIL TAB 20MG 98ENPAC  Whole period 
159558 CIPRAMIL TAB 10MG 28ENPAC  Whole period 
159632 CIPRAMIL TAB 20MG 28ENPAC  Jan 2011 - May 2014 
577221 CIPRAMIL TAB 20MG 250STK  Whole period 
PAROXETINE 
N06AB05 
 
9987 PAROXETIN HEXAL TAB 20MG 20STK Jan 2011 - Jul 2012 
9998 PAROXETIN HEXAL TAB 20MG 60STK Jan 2011 - Jun 2012 
10011 PAROXETIN HEXAL TAB 20MG 100STK Jan 2011 - Sep 2012 
15817 PAROXETIN ACTAVIS TAB 20MG 20ENPAC Whole period 
15828 PAROXETIN ACTAVIS TAB 20MG 60ENPAC Whole period 
15839 PAROXETIN ACTAVIS TAB 20MG 100ENPAC Whole period 
15964 SEROXAT GSK TAB 10MG 28ENPAC Whole period 
38448 SEROXAT GSK TAB 20MG 100ENPAC Whole period 
56078 PAROXETIN PFIZER TAB 20MG 60ENPAC Feb 2012 - Oct 2014 
56089 PAROXETIN PFIZER TAB 20MG 100ENPAC Sept 2011 - Dec 2013 
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59047 PAROXETIN AUROBINDO TAB 20MG 60ENPAC Jan - Oct 2011 
59058 PAROXETIN AUROBINDO TAB 20MG 100ENPAC Jan 2011 - Jan 2012 
ESCITALOPRAM 
N06AB10 
 
5757 CIPRALEX TAB 5MG 28ENPAC  Whole period 
5812 CIPRALEX TAB 10MG 28ENPAC  Whole period 
5834 CIPRALEX TAB 10MG 98ENPAC  Whole period 
5944 CIPRALEX TAB 20MG 98ENPAC  Whole period 
11047 CIPRALEX TAB 10MG 200STK  Whole period 
55757 ESCITALOPRAM RATIO TAB 5MG 28ENPAC Jan - Dec 2011 
55779 ESCITALOPRAM RATIO TAB 10MG 28ENPAC Jan 2011 - Mar 2012 
55790 ESCITALOPRAM RATIO TAB 10MG 56ENPAC Jan 2011 - Jan 2012 
55801 ESCITALOPRAM RATIO TAB 10MG 98ENPAC Jan 2011 - Oct 2012 
55856 ESCITALOPRAM RATIO TAB 20MG 98ENPAC Jan 2011 - Oct 2012 
97524 CIPRALEX TAB 10MG 56ENDOS  Whole period 
114894 ESCITALOPRAM ACTAVIS TAB 10MG 98ENPAC From August 2011 
115854 ESCITALOPRAM TEVA TAB 5MG 30ENPAC From June 2014 
147689 ESCITALOPRAM ACTAVIS TAB 10MG 28ENPAC From August 2011 
183669 ESCITALOPRAM TEVA TAB 20MG 100ENPAC From June 2014 
194954 ESCITALOPRAM ACTAVIS TAB 10MG 56ENPAC From August 2011 
403119 ESCITALOPRAM ACTAVIS TAB 20MG 98ENPAC From August 2011 
409840 ESCITALOPRAM TEVA TAB 10MG 30ENPAC From June 2014 
422719 ESCITALOPRAM TEVA TAB 10MG 56ENPAC From June 2014 
499134 ESCITALOPRAM TEVA TAB 10MG 100ENPAC From June 2014 
499807 ESCITALOPRAM ACTAVIS TAB 5MG 28ENPAC From August 2011 
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Appendix D: Distribution of variables 
When studying the distributions of variables in this section, it is important to keep in min that 
the data will be handled slightly differently in the models applied. Specifically, since 
clustering on GPs is used for every model, the applied distributions will to some extent differ. 
This is especially the case for the probit models, since the amount of observations for one GP 
will depend on how many prescriptions he has made. Groups of dummies that have more 
than two dummies, have only frequencies depicted. 
 
The distributions of the fixed effects models are not shown here. The size of the samples will 
however be equal to the amount of observations for one single indication in the aggregated 
versions. As for the case of “new” and “old” drugs, the fixed effects sample includes all 
ATC’s within the categories of “new” and “old”, without paying attention to the differences 
between ATCs within these categories. As explained in subsection 5.1.1, this is done to avoid 
repeated values within panels.   
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Aggregated sample for “new” to use in twopm and regression 
 Observations Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
doctor_reservation  35 581  0,081 0,170 0 1 
price_diff~e  35 581  289,89 128,20 128,73 444,47 
male  35 581  0,644 0,479 0 1 
comp_county  35 581  0,962 0,063 0,218 1,811 
ln_freq_pr~r  35 581  3,10 1,40 0 6,32 
specialist  35 581  0,623 0,485 0 1 
 Observations Proportion of observations 
within group of dummy 
  
atc 8  14 669  41,2 %    
atc 11  12 507  35,2 %    
atc 13  8 405  23,6 %    
centrality 0  24 406  68,6 %    
centrality 1  6 283  17,7 %    
centrality 2  1 994  5,6 %    
centrality 3  2 898  8,1 %    
2011  6 558  18,4 %    
2012  9 394  26,4 %    
2013  9 697  27,3 %    
2014  9 932  27,9 %    
age 1 (age<40)  7 913  22,2 %    
age 2 (40≤age <55)  13 547  38,1 %    
age 3 (age ≥55)  14 121  39,7 %    
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Sample for “new” for probit model 
 Observations Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
doctor_reservation  1 712 336  0,060 0,238 0 1 
price_diff~e  1 712 336  343,8382 128,1263 128,7265 444,473 
male  1 712 336  0,7116209 0,4530085 0 1 
comp_county  1 712 336  0,9626418 0,0538486 0,2175 1,810811 
ln_freq_pr~r  1 712 336  953010 0,8996997 0 6,318968 
specialist  1 712 336  0,6778938 0,4672835 0 1 
 Observations Proportion of observations 
within group of dummy 
  
atc 8  1 187 561  69,4 %    
atc 11  444 402  26,0 %    
atc 13  80 373  4,7 %    
centrality 0  1 233 330  72,0 %    
centrality 1  311 212  18,2 %    
centrality 2  81 294  4,7 %    
centrality 3  86 500  5,1 %    
2011  388 648  22,7 %    
2012  464 448  27,1 %    
2013  482 050  28,2 %    
2014  377 190  22,0 %    
age 1 (age<40)  300 171  17,5 %    
age 2 (40≤age <55)  645 851  37,7 %    
age 3 (age ≥55)  766 314  44,8 %    
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Aggregated sample for “overall” to use in twopm and regression 
 Observations Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
doctor_reservation  44 268  0,040 0,066 0 1 
price_diff~d  44 268  271,73 71,72 150,84 345,55 
male  44 268  0,636 0,481 0 1 
comp_county  44 268  0,961 0,065 0,22 1,81 
ln_freq_pr~r  44 268  4,64 0,95 0 7,72 
specialist  44 268  0,606 0,489 0 1 
 Observations Proportion of observations 
within group of dummy 
  
indication 0  14 728  33,3 %    
indication 1  14 800  33,4 %    
indication 2  14 740  33,3 %    
centrality 0  29 602  66,9 %    
centrality 1  7 841  17,7 %    
centrality 2  2 743  6,2 %    
centrality 3  4 082  9,2 %    
2011  10 690  24,1 %    
2012  10 969  24,8 %    
2013  11 127  25,1 %    
2014  11 482  25,9 %    
age 1 (age<40)  10 249  23,2 %    
age 2 (40≤age <55)  16 795  37,9 %    
age 3 (age ≥55)  17 224  38,9 %    
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Sample for “overall” for probit model 
 Observations Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
doctor_reservation  6 507 305  0,040 0,196 0 1 
price_diff~d  6 507 305  281,03 67,89 150,84 345,55 
male  6 507 305  0,732 0,443 0,0 1 
comp_county  6 507 305  0,961 0,059 0,218 1,811 
ln_freq_pr~r  6 507 305  5,286 0,720 0 7,723 
specialist  6 507 305  0,673 0,469 0 1 
 Observations Proportion of observations 
within group of dummy 
  
indication 0  1 752 556  26,9 %    
indication 1  3 133 239  48,1 %    
indication 2  1 621 510  24,9 %    
centrality 0  4 353 400  66,9 %    
centrality 1  1 282 399  19,7 %    
centrality 2  403 309  6,2 %    
centrality 3  468 197  7,2 %    
2011  1 657 230  25,5 %    
2012  1 781 988  27,4 %    
2013  1 702 795  26,2 %    
2014  1 365 292  21,0 %    
age 1 (age<40)  1 120 281  17,2 %    
age 2 (40≤age <55)  2 333 139  35,9 %    
age 3 (age ≥55)  3 053 885  46,9 %    
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Aggregated sample for “old” to use in twopm and regression 
 Observations Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
doctor_reservation  105 588  0,065 0,169 0 1 
price_diff~e  105 588  119,66 141,39 0,76 578,17 
male  105 588  0,651 0,477 0 1 
comp_county  105 588  0,961 0,065 0,218 1,811 
ln_freq_pr~r  105 588  2,93 1,44 0 7,68 
specialist  105 588  0,619 0,486 0 1 
 Observations Proportion of observations 
within group of dummy 
  
atc 0  13 286  12,6 %    
atc 1  14 575  13,8 %    
atc 2  13 358  12,7 %    
atc 3  12 308  11,7 %    
atc 4  14 794  14,0 %    
atc 5  12 065  11,4 %    
atc 6  13 212  12,5 %    
atc 7  11 990  11,4 %    
centrality 0  70 368  66,6 %    
centrality 1  19 099  18,1 %    
centrality 2  6 483  6,1 %    
centrality 3  9 638  9,1 %    
2011  25 651  24,3 %    
2012  26 243  24,9 %    
2013  26 583  25,2 %    
2014  27 111  25,7 %    
age 1 (age<40)  23 580  22,3 %    
age 2 (40≤age <55)  40 071  38,0 %    
age 3 (age ≥55)  41 937  39,7 %    
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Sample for “old” for probit model 
 Observations Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
doctor_reservation  5 319 744  0,039 0,194 0 1 
price_diff~e  5 319 744  154,404 113,307 0,757 578,168 
male  5 319 744  0,740 0,439 0 1 
comp_county  5 319 744  0,961 0,060 0,218 1,811 
ln_freq_pr~r  5 319 744  4,792 1,180 0 7,679 
specialist  5 319 744  0,674 0,469 0 1 
 Observations Proportion of observations 
within group of dummy 
  
atc 0  306 921  5,8 %    
atc 1  922 671  17,3 %    
atc 2  336 180  6,3 %    
atc 3  186 784  3,5 %    
atc 4  2 932 785  55,1 %    
atc 5  200 454  3,8 %    
atc 6  276 924  5,2 %    
atc 7  157 025  3,0 %    
centrality 0  3 526 062  66,3 %    
centrality 1  1 052 275  19,8 %    
centrality 2  338 176  6,4 %    
centrality 3  403 231  7,6 %    
2011  1 378 562  25,9 %    
2012  1 456 830  27,4 %    
2013  1 377 705  25,9 %    
2014  1 106 647  20,8 %    
age 1 (age<40)  904 966  17,0 %    
age 2 (40≤age <55)  1 875 450  35,3 %    
age 3 (age ≥55)  2 539 328  47,7 %    
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Appendix E: Descriptive statistics 
For the reasons explained in Appendix C, the limited sample had fewer observations than the 
main sample. An overview of GP reservation rates for the different ATCs is provided below. 
As before, the ATCs in bold italics are not used in the models. A noticeable differences from 
the main sample, is the higher reservation rates in the limited sample. This is probably due to 
the many generic competitors being left out of the sample because of their inconsistent 
market shares. We are in other words left with a sample of drugs that have relatively higher 
rates of generic reservation. As noted earlier however, the relative differences between ATCs 
are not too different from the main sample.    
Reservation rates using limited sample 
  2011 2012 2013 2014 Total 
Ind. ATC docres freq_pres docres freq_pres docres freq_pres docres freq_pres docres freq_pres 
0 0 80.5 % 20 759 76.0 % 22 297 67.8 % 23 120 72.6 % 16 765 74.1 % 82 941 
0 1 0.8 % 183 505 0.8 % 222 029 1.6 % 274 665 1.8 % 243 906 1.3 % 924 105 
0 2 0.7 % 91 790 0.6 % 91 298 1.1 % 91 802 1.6 % 43 675 0.9 % 318 565 
0 3 1.7 % 46 298 2.9 % 48 382 3.8 % 51 639 4.4 % 40 686 3.2 % 187 005 
1 4 75.7 % 24 788 78.7 % 16 168 78.4 % 17 782 81.4 % 9 959 77.9 % 68 697 
1 5 29.1 % 28 189 23.6 % 34 644 22.8 % 31 326 16.5 % 23 887 23.2 % 118 046 
2 6 53.8 % 9 619 48.6 % 8 518 43.8 % 8 185 46.6 % 7 992 48.4 % 34 314 
2 7 8.0 % 23 689 4.3 % 32 881 5.6 % 35 421 4.8 % 33 652 5.5 % 125 643 
2 8 8.9 % 134 648 36.9 % 47 001 59.0 % 20 404 57.7 % 14 021 22.9 % 216 074 
3 9 13.1 % 165 128 11.9 % 182 955 10.4 % 196 212 8.6 % 168 005 11.0 % 712 300 
3 10 8.7 % 44 191 8.1 % 43 443 6.2 % 43 761 5.3 % 30 696 7.2 % 162 091 
3 11 7.8 % 110 274 9.3 % 114 329 9.3 % 127 341 9.3 % 93 743 9.0 % 445 687 
4 12 21.0 % 55 620 19.1 % 55 318 17.7 % 61 201 14.1 % 71 305 17.7 % 243 444 
4 13 -- -- 49.0 % 5 339 67.5 % 5 113 70.2 % 4 913 61.9 % 15 365 
 Total 11.7 % 938 498 12.3 % 924 602 11.2 % 987 972 10.3 % 803 205 11.4 % 3 654 277 
 
 
Trend in reservation levels for “old” ATCs 6 and 7, versus that of the “new” ATC 8.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Trend in reservation for ATC 8 
 
Figure 3 Trend in reservation for ATC 6 and 7 
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Figure 4: Trend in reservation for ATC 9 and 10 
 
Figure 5: Trend in reservation for ATC 11 
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Appendix F: Tests 
“Overall” models 
 
Test of heteroskedastisity in OLS model 
Hypothesis of homoscedasticity firmly rejected 
 
 
Test of omitted variables in OLS model 
Hypothesis of no omitted variables firmly rejected 
 
 
Test of multicollinearity for OLS-model 
Noting that determining there is no single measure of when the value of the variance inflator 
factor (VIF) is “too high”, Wooldridge (2013, p. 98) suggests that VIFs above 10 can indicate 
a troublesome level of multicollinearity. In the STATA output below, we see that indication 2 
and price difference are the only variables above this threshold.   
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Pearson test for goodness of fit for overall probit part of twopm 
 
 
Predicted probabilities: sensitivity and specificity – overall probit for twopm 
 
 
Probit model (main) 
Predicted probabilities: sensitivity and specificity  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cut-off “0.5”  
 
Cut-off “0.05”  
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 Pearson test for goodness of fit for probit model 
 
 
 
“New” drugs 
 
Probit 
Predictive power with sensitivity and specificity, and pearson test for goodness of fit for 
probit model 
 
 
Twopm 
Predictive power with sensitivity and specificity, and pearson test for goodness of fit for 
probit part of twopm 
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Graphical representation of deviance residuals from GLM model of twopm 
 
 
 
 
“Old” drugs 
 
Probit 
Predictive power with sensitivity and specificity, and pearson test for goodness of fit for 
probit model 
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Twopm 
Predictive power with sensitivity and specificity, and pearson test for goodness of fit for 
probit part of twopm 
 
 
Graphical representation of deviance residuals from GLM model of twopm 
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 Fixed effects 
 
Hausman test for random effects models 
With reference to Green (2005, pp. 379-380), the Hausman test looks at the covariance 
matrix of the estimates in determining whether the errors are correlated with the independent 
variables. If they are, a fixed effects model is preferred. The null-hypothesis of no correlation 
with the regressors is rejected for every indication. 
 
Indication 0 (ulcer) 
 
 
 
Indication 1 (cholesterol) 
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Indication 2 (depression) 
 
 
 
Old ATCs 
 
 
 
New ATCs 
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Modified wald-test for heteroskedasticity 
The null hypothesis of homoskedasticity is rejected for all models when not having specified 
the cluster-option.  
 
Indication 0 
 
 
Indication 1 
 
 
Indication 2 
 
 
 
“OLD” drugs 
 
 
“NEW” drugs 
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Distribution of individual error terms for indications 1 & 2, old/new 
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Appendix G: Model results from limited sample 
Results from ”overall” 
OLS REGRESSION 
 
 
PROBIT 
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TWOPM 
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TWOPM PREDICTIONS 
 
 
Results from ”new” and ”old” 
To save space, only the results from the twopm’s will be presented here.  
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 twopm - "new" drugs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
twopm – “old” drugs 
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twopm predictions - "new" drugs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
twopm predictions - "old" drugs 
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Appendix H: Model results for separate years 
For ease of reading, we have chosen to only show the results of the twopm when analysing 
the years separately. When limiting the models to looking at years separately, the models will 
accordingly be based on fewer observations.  
 
”Overall”  
 
TWO PM predictions 2011  
 
 
TWO PM predictions 2012  
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TWO PM predictions 2013  
 
 
TWO PM predictions 2014  
 
 
“New” drugs 
 
TWO PM predictions 2011  
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TWO PM predictions 2012  
 
 
 
TWO PM predictions 2013  
 
 
 
TWO PM predictions 2014  
 
 
”Old” drugs 
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Figure 4 TWOPM predictions 2011  
 
 
 
Figure 5 TWOPM predictions 2012  
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Figure 6 TWOPM predictions 2013  
 
 
 
Figure 7 TWOPM predictions 2014  
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Appendix I: Competition 
A number of different variables to serve as a proxy for competition were tested. The table 
below gives a short explanation and overview. Outputs from the twopm on all indications 
follow. Since the variables were not tested for all the different samples (limited sample, “old” 
and “new” indications etc.), some of the variables that turn out insignificant here might prove 
to be significant with other samples. 
 
 
 
Explanation 
Desired sign to 
support 
hypothesis 
Observed, 
predicted effect p-value 
comp_municipality Proportion of 
aggregated list spots 
filled in a 
municipality 
(-) (-) 0,000 
shortage Dummy variable 
(=1) if a GP has a 
patient deficit of ≥ 
100 
(-) (+) 0,200 
herfindahl Sum of squared 
proportion of 
market share for 
every GP in a 
municipality 
(-) (+) 0,001 
competition Proportion of list 
filled for a given GP (-) (-) 0,373 
nr_open_municipalitylist Number of lists with 
availability in a 
municipality 
(-) (-) 0,000 
freq_practices Number of practices 
in a municipality (-) (-) 0,000 
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“comp_municipality” – predictions twopm 
 
 
“shortage” – predictions twopm 
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“herfindahl” – predictions twopm 
 
 
“competition” - predictions twopm 
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“nr_open_municipalitylist” - predictions twopm 
 
 
"freq_practices" - predictions twopm 
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